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PURITY LOST: THE PARADOXICAL FACE OF THE NEW 




Evolution means nothing but growth in the widest sense of that word. 
Reproduction, of course, is merely one of the incidents of growth. And 
what is growth? Not mere increase. Spencer says it is the passage from 
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous — or, if we prefer English to 
Spencerese — diversification. 
Charles Pierce, Collected Papers (1931) section 1.174 
 
"The fact is that complexity is self-potentiating. Complex systems 
generally engender further principles of order that produce yet greater 
complexities. Complex organisms create an impetus towards complex 
societies, complex machines towards complex industries, complex 
armaments towards complex armies. And the world's complexity means 
there is, now and always, more to reality than our science – or for that 
matter our speculation and our philosophy – is able to dream of". 
Nicholas Rescher, Nature and Understanding: 
The Metaphysics and Method of Science (2000) 24-25. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern international law seems to be in disarray. The classic doctrines of 
international law, with their focus on sovereignty, state consent, custom 
and treaty, do not provide a satisfactory explanation for many of the 
practices and institutional structures that fill the global legal universe. The 
                                                 
* Part of this paper was written while I was at Osgoode Hall Law School as a Fellow of 
the CLPE Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Network in the fall of 
2006. My thanks to Osgoode Hall Law School and to CLPE Director, Peer Zumbansen, 
for the invitation and the warm reception during my stay. Earlier versions of this paper 
were presented at the Putting Theory to Practice public lectures series at Osgoode in 
October 2006, at the Institute for International Law and Public Policy, Temple University 
Beasley School of Law, September 2006, and at the conference Sovereignty, Supremacy, 
Subsidiarity: the Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law, an International 
Conference in Honour of Prof. Ruth Lapidoth, the Hebrew University, Faculty of Law, 
June 2006. I want to thank the participants of these events for their comments. I also want 
to thank Jeffrey Dunoff and Peer Zumbansen for their helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this article. 
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contemporary legal terrain seems to be characterized by overlapping 
jurisdictions, inconsistent doctrinal interpretations and competing 
worldviews. But what are the social implications of the deepening 
fragmentation and increasing complexity of the global legal system? Some 
observers argue that these phenomena constitute a new global risk, which 
requires urgent collective response. Global constitutionalisation is put 
forward in this context as a possible and appropriate reaction.1  
Using the notions of purity and paradox the article develops an analytic 
framework in which the increasing complexity of the international legal 
system can be elucidated. Drawing on this framework the article considers 
the consequences of the complexification of the global legal system in 
terms of its stability and legitimacy. Rather than seeing the messy and 
complex nature of modern international law as a risk this article depicts it 
as an evolutionary achievement which extends the horizon of possibilities 
through which the international legal system can react to social pressures. 
The attempts to purify the international legal system by appealing to grand 
theories - constitutional, moral or other - are ill-conceived. First, because 
they fail to recognize the innate paradoxicality of the law. Second, because 
they constitute a threat to the legitimacy and resilience of the global legal 
system. The article explores in this context alternative institutional models 
which draw upon – rather than oppose - the complexity and paradoxicality 
of modern international law.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. It opens with a discussion of the 
Westphalian scheme of validity (what I will call 'the purity thesis') (section 
                                                 
1 This was the approach of two former Presidents of the International Court of Justice 
("ICJ"), Judge Stephen M. Schwebel and Judge Gilbert Guillaume. Both expressed their 
concern of the proliferation of international judicial bodies and the increasing 
fragmentation of the international legal order and suggested, as a solution, to extend and 
reaffirm, through various measures, the powers and international status of the ICJ. See: 
Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by Judge 
Stephen M. Schwebel, President of the International Court of Justice, 26 October 1999, 
http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresidentGA54_19991026.htm; Address 
by Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice to the United 
Nations General Assembly, 27 October 2000, http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresident_Guillaume_SixthCommittee_20
001027.htm. 




II). It then proceeds to consider the invocation of the Westphalian scheme 
within new international regimes such as the World Trade Organization 
and the International Criminal Court, arguing that the Westphalian scheme 
creates irresolvable paradoxes within these regimes (section III). To 
facilitate this argument the article develops a model of paradoxicality in 
philosophy and law. Section IV explores alternative forms of validation 
which are claiming to fill the normative void that was caused by the 
demise of the Westphalian model. On close inspection these alternative 
principles emerge as equally problematic in terms of their coherence or 
completeness. Section V takes a step back by looking into the history of 
international legal theory. Historical examination demonstrates that 
international law has never been pure. I show that this impurity closely 
parallels the problem of grounding in philosophy, especially as reflected in 
the semantic paradox entitled 'the Truth-Teller Paradox'. The last part of 
this section explores the role of paradoxes in the dynamics of autonomous 
and self-organizing systems (such as law). But what then is unique in the 
current state of international law? This question is addressed in section VI 
which argues that what is unique in the current system of international law 
is not the impurity of our forms of validation - but the proliferation of 
multiple, paradoxical, validating techniques, which are invoked, 
simultaneously, at the forefront of the international legal body. The 
contemporary universe of transnational law is characterized by a shift 
from (imaginary) purity to multiple paradoxicality – a process of 
polymorphosis. But what are the practical consequences this process? The 
remainder of this article explores the sociological implications of this 
process, drawing on ideas from systems theory and ecology. It concludes 
with a discussion of the false promise of global constitutionalism, setting it 
against an alternative institutional model: non-hierarchical reflexivity.  
 
 
II. PURITY: THE WESTPHALIAN NARRATIVE 
  
The pure conception of international law aspired to provide a complete 
and coherent account of the structure of international law. In particular it 
argued that international law regulates – in a complete and coherent 
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fashion - the creation of new (international) norms.2. A succinct 
description of the Westphalian narrative can be found in an article 
published by Leo Gross in 1948:3 
 
”The Peace of Westphalia… marks the end of an epoch which leads from 
the old into the new world… In the political field it marked man's 
abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical structure of society and his 
option for a new system characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity 
of states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another, and free 
from any external earthly authority. The idea of an authority or 
organization above the sovereign states is no longer... This new system 
rests on international law and the balance of power, a law operating 
between rather than above states and a power operating between rather 
than above states". 
 
In the legal domain the Westphalian narrative was translated into an 
articulated doctrine of validity and authority. This doctrine – in the form 
explicated here – constitutes what I call – the pure vision of international 
law.4 One of the most eloquent advocates of the purity thesis was Josef 
Kunz. Kunz argued that international law regulates the creation of 
                                                 
2 For an historical account of the development of the theory of international law, see, for 
example, Martti Koskenniemi, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001) chapters 5 & 6 and Dinah Shelton, Normative 
Hierarchy in International Law, 100 American Journal of International Law 291 (2006).  
3 Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 American Journal of International 
Law 20, 28-29 (1948). The Westphalian narrative was discussed in numerous articles and 
books. See, for example, Amos S. Hershey, History of International Law Since the Peace 
of Westphalia, 6 American Journal of International Law 30 (1912) and Andreas Osiander, 
Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 International 
Organization 251 (2001). 
4 This vision can be associated of course with the positivistic school whose most obvious 
representative in the early 20th century is Hans Kelsen. See, Martti Koskenniemi, 
Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law, 8 European Journal of 
International Law 215, 216-217 (1997) and Jorg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the 
Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its 
Problems 15 European Journal of International Law 523, 548 (2004). 




international norms through two, hierarchically ordered, procedures: 
custom and treaty: "Treaty and custom are two different, independent 
procedures for creating international legal norms".5 Both are based on the 
notion of state consent. Custom, Kunz argued, is the hierarchically higher 
form of creating norms of international law. "Custom-produced general 
international law is the basis; the customary principle of 'Pacta sunt 
servanda' is the reason for validity of all particular international law 
created by the treaty procedure".6 International law also lays down the 
conditions under which the procedure of custom creates valid norms of 
general international law. These two conditions are usage and opinio 
juris.7 Jus cogens norms, to the extent that they have not been codified in 
treaties, constitute another type of customary law.8 This legal articulation 
of the Westphalian narrative seeks to provide a complete and seemingly 
coherent account of the way in which international law regulates the 
creation of new norms. This account, although without explicit 
hierarchical order, also underlies article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, which states that international disputes 
                                                 
5 Joseph. L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 The American Journal 
of International Law 662, 665 (1953). 
6 Kunz, ibid, 665. The status of the norm pacta sunt servanda as a norm of general 
international law is probably beyond doubt. Kunz argues that it constitutes "the axiom, 
postulate and categorical imperative of the science of international law" and is 
"undoubtedly a positive norm of general international law" Joseph. L. Kunz, The 
Meaning and the Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda 39 The American Journal of 
International Law 180 (1945). Its status received further recognition in the text of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at Vienna, 23 May 1969, entered into 
force on 27 January 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (see in 
particular the definitions of “ratification,” “acceptance,” “approval,” and “accession” in 
Article 2 of the Convention).  See also: Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to 
Law and Globalization, 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 485, 487 (2005). 
7 Kunz, supra note 5, at 665. On the interpretation of these two conditions see further, 
Kammerhofer, supra note 4.  
8 See, Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-party States 
64 Law and Contemporary Problems 13, 57 (2001) (with respect to the prohibitions 
against genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). 
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should be resolved primarily through the application of international 
conventions and international custom.9                  
 
 
III. PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE 
CURRENT INVOCATIONS OF THE WESTPHALIAN 
NARRATIVE 
 
In describing the demise of the Westphalian legal order writers usually 
refer to processes of norm-development in non-state arenas, to the 
increasing importance of non-state actors such as Non Governmental 
Organizations ('NGOs') and Multinational Enterprises ('MNEs'), to the 
law-making powers of international tribunals and to the emergence of 
general principles of global humanitarian law.10 However, despite the 
continuing talk about the demise of the Westphalian order its underlying 
principles of state sovereignty and state consent continue to play an 
important role in the structure of various international legal regimes. It is 
interesting, therefore, to consider the way in which the Westphalian 
scheme of validity (as postulated by Joseph Kunz and Leo Gross) is 
invoked in contemporary treaty regimes. This section explores this 
question in the context of two key treaty instruments: the World Trade 
Organization ('WTO') and the International Criminal Court ('ICC'). I will 
argue that the invocation of the Westphalian validity doctrine in these 
treaties generates deep inconsistencies that undermine its claim to provide 
coherent and complete foundations for modern international law. 
 
                                                 
9 Available at the ICJ website: http://www.icj-cij.org (basic documents). It is also echoed 
in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention which states that "A treaty is void if, at the time 
of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law", thus 
reflecting the hierarchical order postulated by Kunz.  
10 For a general discussion of the demise of the Westphalian paradigm see: Gunther 
Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, In G. Teubner (ed.), 
Global Law Without a State, , pp. 3-30 (1997) and Berman, supra note 6.  




Exposing the paradoxes and inconsistencies associated with the 
Westphalian doctrinal apparatus requires that I first elucidate the meaning 
of paradox in both logic and law. This theoretical detour also sets the 
ground for the broader thesis of this article – which explores the dynamic 







A. DETOUR: PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LAW 
 
1. PARADOXES: A GENERAL EXPOSITION 
 
What do we mean by the concept of "paradox"? The term ‘paradox’ is 
sometimes used informally to designate a statement which conflicts with 
the common view.11 Within the realm of law, this understanding can be 
applied to any legal claim which challenges a received legal opinion. I am 
interested in other forms of paradoxes, which do not reflect a transitory 
interpretative dispute, but rather expose a deeper social and linguistic 
problematic.  
 
The philosophical literature offers various definitions of this more 
challenging understanding of the concept of paradox. Thus one view 
focuses on the deep inconsistency associated with paradoxes. Nicholas 
Rescher, for example, defines paradox as a "set of propositions that are 
individually plausible but collectively inconsistent".12 Another view 
emphasises the paradox’s problematical conclusion, taking paradox as "an 
argument that begins with premises that appear to be clearly true, that 
                                                 
11 Thus, the definition of paradox in the Oxford dictionary opens with: "Statement 
contrary to received opinion". See The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 
(1964, 5h ed) at 880.  
12 See Nicholas Rescher, Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution (2001) at xxi.  
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proceeds according to inference rules that appear to be valid, but that ends 
in contradiction".13 Other thinkers, such as W.V. Quine, have highlighted 
the reasoning pattern that generates the paradox. ‘An antinomy produces a 
self-contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. It establishes that some 
tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and 
henceforward be avoided or revised’.14 In light of these general reflections 
it is possible to distinguish between two major types of paradoxes.15 
Paradoxes of coherence expose a deep inconsistency in some well-defined 
set of sentences or propositions.16 Semantical paradoxes involve the 
notions of truth, falsity and reference, and challenge the way we reason 
with these notions.17  
 
To get a better sense of the notion of paradox let us consider a specific and 
famous example - the paradox of the liar.18 Consider the following 
sentence 
                                                 
13 Charles S. Chihara, The Semantic Paradoxes: A Diagnostic Investigation 88 The 
Philosophical Review 590 (1979). For a similar view see: RM Sainsbury, Paradoxes 
(1995) at 1 
14 WV Quine, The Ways of Paradox (1966) at 7.   
15  This distinction is not exhaustive, see Rescher, supra note 12, at 72-73.  .  
16 I use the term ‘deep inconsistency’ to distinguish such paradoxes from mere 
contradictions. The difference between the two terms lies in the way in which paradoxes 
make the contradiction appear inescapable. See Peter Suber, The Paradox of Self-
Amendment 7 Stanford Literature Review 53 (1990). I will sometimes use the term 
‘logical paradoxes’ to refer to this type of paradoxes. 
17 Another useful taxonomy is Quine’s distinction between ‘veridical’ and ‘falsidical’ 
paradoxes (see Quine, supra note 14, at 4-5). Veridical paradox is, in effect, a truth-
telling argument or proof; it establishes that some proposition is true or false (eg, the 
Barber Paradox). Falsidical paradox, in contrast, ‘is one whose proposition not only 
seems at first absurd but also is false, there being fallacy in the purported proof’. A 
typical example is Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. 
18 The discussion of semantical paradoxes involves of course the question of the meaning 
of truth and falsity. However, because of the deep controversy that exists within 
philosophy with respect to the meaning of truth I decided not to delve into this question. 





K1 This sentence is false (we can also present this sentence in the 
following format: ‘K1 K1 is false’). 
 
K1 produces a paradoxical loop: if it is true, it is false; and if it is false, it is 
true. This sentence refuses, so it seems, to be attributed with a stable truth 
value.  It is possible to structure a similar paradox which is hetero-
referential rather than self-referential. Consider the following set of 
sentences which, following Roy Sorensen, I will call the ‘looped liar’:19 
 
Plato: what Socrates says is true 
Socrates: What Plato says is false 
 
Like the liar sentence it is impossible to attribute stable and coherent truth 
values to this pair.20  
 
A feature common to the 'self-referential liar' and the 'looped liar' is their 
semantic instability: their perpetual oscillation between truth and falsity. 21 
The ‘Liar Paradox’ and the 'looped liar' seem to suffer from some kind of 
semantic pathology, which is unsettling because of the way in which it 
                                                                                                                         
One can find within philosophy five major theories of truth: the Correspondence Theory; 
the Semantic Theory; the Deflationary (or Minimalist) Theory; the Coherence Theory, 
and the Pragmatic Theory. For a useful introduction to this debate, see Bradley Dowden, 
‘Truth’ in Fieser and Dowden (eds), The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2004), 
available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/truth.htm. Semantical paradoxes create a problem, 
though, for each of these theories. One initial assumption which I do make is that 
statements can be either true or false (the law of excluded middle).  
19 Roy Sorensen, A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the 
Mind (2003) at 211. This version of the liar can be traced back to the medieval thinker 
John Buridan (1295-1356). Sorensen, ibid , at 201-215. 
20 One can construct a liar-like paradox which is non-circular. See, Stephen Yablo, 
Paradox without Self-Reference, 53 Analysis 251 (1993). 
21 Hans Herzberger, Naive Semantics and the Liar Paradox, 79 The Journal of 
Philosophy 479, 482 (1982).  
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challenges our conventional grammatical structures, and our usage of 
basic notions such as truth and reference.22 
 
 
2. PARADOXES IN LAW: INCOHERENCE AND PARALYSIS 
 
Logical and semantical paradoxes have existed for more than 2000 years. 
Early versions of the liar paradox can be found in the Christian scriptures 
and in Greek and medieval writings.23 These paradoxes have not, however, 
brought human thought to a stand-still. While philosophers have continued 
to deliberate about the proper solution to the Liar paradox people have 
continued to use the notions of truth and falsity in their every-day 
reasoning, and scientists have continued their search for true descriptions. 
However the presence of paradoxes and deep inconsistencies in the law 
seems more threatening, calling into question the capacity of the law to 
fulfil its function as a reliable arbiter of social conflicts and a source of 
normative expectations. Paradoxes can undermine these legal functions, 
either by leading to paralysis and deadlocks or by generating chaos and 
indeterminacy, causing people to replace the law with other forms of 
governance. 
 
Thus, the puzzle of legal paradoxicality deserves closer scrutiny. The first 
step toward the resolution of this puzzle is to identify the proper referent 
of legal paradoxes. I think that the most suitable candidate for that role is 
what I will call a legal set: a sequence of sentences which invoke, 
explicitly or implicitly, the legal code (the distinction between legal and 
illegal). A legal set may include three major types of normative sentences: 
norms, norm-propositions (statements about norms), or meta-propositions 
(statements about the entire legal system).24 These types of normative 
                                                 
22 See also Adam Reiger, ‘The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence’ (2001) 54 
Erkenntnis 195.   
23 Sorensen, supra note 19, at 197. Other paradoxes such as the paradoxes of motion, 
attributed to Zeno are also ancient, see Sorensen, ibid, at 49. Sorensen's book provides a 
comprehensive discussion of the history of paradox.   
24  See also: Jose Juan Moreso, Putting Legal Objectivity in its Place. In Analisi e 
diritto edited by G. Giappichelli, at 243 (2004). 




sentences may be: prescriptive (ought to), permissive (may) or prohibitive 
(may not).25 Law includes additional types of norms, such as norms 
conferring public or private powers⎯ competence norms (the competence 
to issue other norms) or determinative norms (norms that define certain 
concepts).26 One way in which a legal set may be formed is to extract a 
segment from the law’s printed history (understood as the entire genealogy 
of rules and case law pertaining to a particular legal domain).27 A paradox 
arises whenever a legal set, or a portion of it, is self-contradictory, and 
when this self-contradiction is supported by apparently good reasons.28 
 
Two primary features of legal paradoxes distinguish them from logical and 
semantical paradoxes. These differences influence, as I will demonstrate, 
the practical consequences of paradoxes in law. The first distinctive 
feature of legal paradoxes concerns the unique composition of the legal 
                                                 
25 Sven Ove Hansson, Situationist Deontic Logic 26 Journal of Philosophical Logic 423, 
428 (1997). 'All Israeli citizens are obligated not to emit sewage into the sea' is an 
example of a prohibitive norm. 'Israeli law prohibits the emission of sewage into the sea' 
is an example of norm proposition; it is a proposition about the existence of a legal norm. 
'The Israeli legal system is a combination of the common law and civil law traditions' is a 
meta-proposition. Two other normative types which are mentioned in the literature are: 'it 
is gratuitous that' and 'it is optional that'. Something is gratuitous if and only if it is not 
obligatory, and it is optional if and only neither it nor its negation is obligatory. See, 
McNamara, Paul, "Deontic Logic", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/logic-deontic/, section 1.2. 
26 For these further types see Eugenio Bulygin, On Norms of Competence, 11 Law and 
Philosophy 201 (1992).  
27 But one can also form a legal set by using second-order observations of the law – for 
example, by giving an account of a certain theory of law. Theorizing in law reflects either 
an attempt to study ‘how far principles, notions, and rules for decision-making can be 
generalized’ (Niklas Luhmann, Law As a Social System (2004) 54-5) or a meta-attempt to 
expose the general structure of the law. For more on the role and nature of legal theories, 
see David E. Van Zandt, The Relevance of Social Theory to Legal Theory 83 
Northwestern University Law Review 10 (1989). 
28  A different but related problem is indeterminacy. See, further section V(2) below and 
the discussion of the truth-teller paradox. 
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set. Because legal sets may include both norms and propositional 
statements, their contradictory form is not limited to conflicting 
attributions of truth and falsity.29 This is because norms are usually 
thought to lack truth-value.30 The second distinctive feature of legal 
paradoxes, to which I will return later in sections V and VI, relates to their 
dynamic quality. It reflects the fact that law is a social system and not a 
static register of norms. In other words legal paradoxes influence the 
world of action, and should be examined with this in mind.  
 
But let me delay for a moment the discussion of the systemic impact of 
legal paradoxes and consider them in light of the peculiarities of a legal 
set. I do not intend to provide here a formal account of the way in which 
legal-oriented sentences can relate to, or contradict, each other.31 For my 
purposes, it will suffice to give an intuitive account of what is unique in 
legal inconsistency, and provide a few paradigmatic examples. A legal set 
may be inconsistent, first, when it can be shown to contain contradictory 
norms. Norms or rules can be contradictory, for example, when one rule 
permits what another forbids, when two rules issue contradictory 
directives (which cannot be simultaneously complied with).32 A further 
form of inconsistency arises when one can find within a legal set 
conflicting interpretations of the same legal concept. Another form of 
inconsistency, which is unique to law, arises when one can show that a 
                                                 
29 However, norm-propositions, propositions that state that a given action is obligatory 
(required), permitted (allowed), or forbidden (prohibited) according to a given norm, can 
have truth value. 
30  As Henrik von Wright puts it: "Norms as prescriptions of human conduct… may be 
pronounced (un)reasonable, (un)just, or (in)valid when judged by some standards which 
are themselves normative – but not true or false"; Henrik von Wright, Is There a Logic of 
Norms, 4 Ratio Juris 265, 266 (1991). 
31 Deontic logic represents an attempt to provide such a formalistic account. However, 
this formalistic presentation is not really necessary for the arguments presented here. See, 
eg, von Wright, ibid and McNamara supra note 25. 
32 See von Wright, ibid, at 270-1. This form of inconsistency could give rise to 
conflicting normative expectations. 




legal set includes contradictory assignments of validity. The notion of 
validity plays, as I will argue later, a unique role in the law, something 
akin to the notion of truth in logic. It is the validity of the law that makes 
its normative statements binding.33   
 
Let us consider two examples of legal paradoxes. Consider first a legal 
version of the liar paradox. I follow the conventional Deontic notation 
with OBp denoting 'it is obligatory that p'. 
 
 O1 It is obligatory not to follow this rule. (This can also be presented 
as: O1 O~O1) 
 
This statement (interpreted as a norm rather than norm-proposition) is 
clearly self-contradictory. It generates conflicting directives. It is similar to 
the following prescription: 
 




The self-contradictory nature of O1 and O2 makes it impossible to satisfy 
them – their satisfaction set is empty. Impossibility is the pathological 
symptom that accompanies normative contradiction.34 
                                                 
33 Note, however, that since legal sets may also include ‘normal’ propositions, and may 
invoke classical reasoning patterns (Even if this is done only implicitly and non-
exclusively) they can also be contradictory in the sense in which this notion is used in 
propositional logic (ie, through inconsistent attributions of truth and falsity). On the role 
of classical deductive patterns in legal reasoning see: Arend Soeteman, Legal logic? Or 
can we do without? 11 Artificial Intelligence and Law 197 (2003). 
34 I follow Vranas here; see Peter B. M. Vranas, New foundations for deontic logic: A 
preliminary sketch" Unpublished Manuscript, available at  
http://www.public.iastate.edu/~vranas/Homesite/papers/deonticweb.doc  (2002), at 
section 3. Note however, that while O1 and O2 are self-contradictory, a norm-proposition 
that describes a norm which is self-contradictory can be true and non contradictory. See 
Lennart Aqvist, Interpretations of Deontic Logic 73 Mind 246, 249 (1964). It is also 
possible to construct looped contradictory obligations with similar consequences: 
O3 You ought to follow rule O4. 
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The paradoxes of law tend however to be more subtle than these examples. 
So let us consider another less blunt example. This example follows the 
Greek story of Protagoras and Euathlus. I will follow the story as it was 
told by Aulus Gellius.35 Protagoras ("the keenest of all sophists")36 taught 
rhetoric and argumentation. Euathlus, who wished to be instructed in the 
art of oratory and the pleading of causes (what is called law today) became 
a pupil of Protagoras. It was agreed between the two that Euathlus will pay 
his fee after he won his first case.37 After having been a pupil and follower 
of Protagoras for some time, and having made considerable progress in the 
study of oratory, Euathlus nevertheless had not undertaken any cases. 
Protagoras decided to demand his fee according to the contract, and he 
brought a suit against Euathlus. 
 
Protagoras and Euathlus presented their arguments before the court. 
Protagoras began as follows:38  
 
                                                                                                                         
O4  You ought not to follow rule O3. 
35 Aulus Gellius, The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius (c. 150 C.E.), trans. John C. Rolfe, 3 
vols., The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, rev. ed., vol. I, Book V, x, 
pp. 405-09 (1946). All the following quotes are from Gellius, ibid. This account was 
written roughly 600 years after the events (if they indeed occur) since it is assumed that 
Protagoras lived from 492 to 421 B.C.E. See, J. A. Davison, Protagoras, Democritus, 
and Anaxagoras 3 The Classical Quarterly 33, 38 (1953). This paradox was discussed by 
other ancient writers. See, for details Jordan Howard Sobel, The Law Student and his 
Teacher LIII Theoria 1 (1987).  
36 Gellius, ibid at 405. Protagoras has drafted the constitution of Thuria and taught in the 
Sicilian School of rhetoric. See, Davison, ibid, at 33. 
37 Gellius writes that Euathlus paid Protagoras half of the fee before beginning his 
lessons, and agreed to pay the remaining half "on the day when he first pleaded before 
jurors and won his case", ibid at 407. 
38 Gellius, ibid at 407. 




“Let me tell you, most foolish of youths, that in either event you will have 
to pay what I am demanding, whether judgment be pronounced for or 
against you. For if the case goes against you, the money will be due me in 
accordance with the verdict, because I have won; but if the decision be in 
your favour, the money will be due me according to our contract, since 
you will have won a case”. 
 
To this Euathlus replied:39  
 
“I might have met this sophism of yours, tricky as it is, by not pleading my 
own cause but employing another as my advocate. But I take greater 
satisfaction in a victory in which I defeat you, not only in the suit, but also 
in this argument of yours. So let me tell you in turn, wisest of masters, that 
in either event I shall not have to pay what you demand, whether judgment 
be pronounced for or against me. For if the jurors decide in my favour, 
according to their verdict nothing will be due you, because I have won; but 
if they give judgment against me, by the terms of our contract I shall owe 
you nothing, because I have not won a case”. 
 
Gellius concludes the story by noting that the court was struck by the 
intricacy of the arguments and refused to give a ruling:40 
 
"… the jurors, thinking that the plea on both sides was uncertain and 
insoluble, for fear that their decision, for whichever side it was rendered, 
might annul itself, left the matter undecided and postponed the case to a 
distant day. Thus a celebrated master of oratory was refuted by his 
youthful pupil with his own argument, and his cleverly devised sophism 
failed". 
 
The story of Protagoras and Euathlus reveals an internal paradox within 
the normative structure governing this case, leading – at least according to 
Gellius – to a decisional paralysis. To make the paradox more precise let 
us disentangle the story into a series of norms and norm-propositions. 
                                                 
39 Gellius, ibid at 407-9. 
40 Gellius, ibid at 409. 
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(1) In deciding a contractual dispute a Court should give effect to and
 enforce the contractual commitments made by the parties. 
(2) According to the contract made between Protagoras and Euathlus,  
Euathlus will pay the full fee only after he won his first case. 
Protagoras brought a suit against Euathlus claiming his fee. This 
was Euathlus' first case. 
(3) Hence, by (1) Protagoras' suit should be rejected since at the time  
the court was required to give a ruling, the contractual condition 
had not been fulfilled. 
(4) If the court rejects Protagoras' suit (ruling for Euathlus), it will, by  
this very act, fulfill the contractual condition, thus completing 
Protagoras' cause of action.41 
(5) Hence, by (1) Protagoras' suit should be accepted. 
(6) If the court accepts Protagoras' suit, Euathlus will in fact lose; by  
its ruling the Court will cause the contractual condition not be 
fulfilled.  
(7) Hence, by (1) Protagoras' suit should be rejected. 
 
Statements (3) and (5) and (7) are clearly contradictory. Attempting to 
reason about the correct legal answer leads to a seemingly insoluble 
oscillation, in which a ruling for Euathlus, leads to a ruling for Protagoras, 
leading to a ruling for Euathlus ad infinitum.42 The paradox is generated 
by the fact that – due to the contract's peculiar structure – the correct legal 
answer (which should be reflected in the ruling) depends in an unsettling 
way on the court's ultimate ruling.43 This pathological oscillation is similar 
to the semantic instability generated by the liar paradox; in the legal 
context it may lead to judicial paralysis, as indeed was reported by Gellius. 
However, in law paralysis is not an acceptable option. Legal decisions 
                                                 
41 This proposition builds on the fact that the ruling operates as a performative speech-act. 
Such speech-acts have the capacity of making themselves true or binding by being 
pronounced in adequate circumstances. See, Lennart Aqvist, Some Remarks on 
Performatives in the Law 11 Artificial Intelligence and the Law 105, 106, 110 (2003). 
42 See also on this point, Sobel, supra note 35, at 10. 
43 See Sobel, ibid.  




unlike decisions in science, math or philosophy cannot be deferred to a 
later date.44 That decisions must be made is, in itself, a basic norm of any 
legal system.  
 
Indeed, the praxis of law seems to adhere to this basic precept showing 
little signs of paradoxical stoppages. This may signal that the role 
paradoxes are playing in law is not really pathological. But let us return to 
the story of Protagoras and Euathlus. Despite its seemingly insolubility 
there are several ways in which this paradox may be resolved.  They are 
based on two primary techniques: introducing a distinction 
(reinterpretation) or appealing to external principles.  
 
Consider, first, the option of reinterpretation. The court has several ways 
to reinterpret the foregoing problematic normative cluster. The first option 
disentangles the temporal components of the paradox. In determining the 
status of the parties' rights and obligations the court does not need to take a 
forward looking approach; that is, it does not have to consider the 
consequences of its ruling on the parties contractual obligations. Rather it 
needs only to assess their rights as they are at the moment of its decision. 
According to this interpretation (3) represents the correct decision, 
implying that Protagoras suit was premature, and (5) and (7) are simply 
incorrect. This interpretation lays the foundation, though, for a future suit 
by Protagoras.45 Another approach seeks to resolve the paradox by 
focusing on its self-referential aspect. Thus the phrase ‘first case’ may be 
interpreted as not applicable to a case involving Protagoras and Euathlus 
as parties, thus barring the problematic self reference that is generated by 
the contract. This requires us to reformulate (2) again resolving the 
paradox (leading to a ruling against Protagoras).  
                                                 
44 This is not always recognized by philosophers. Thus, Jordan Howard Sobel notes for 
example that "rather than reach a final disposition in the case a court might be moved to 
suspend the case, to put off or postpone judgement to a later day. This action could 
recommend itself as a desperate expedient to avoid self-contradiction: deferral could 
recommend itself to a court that considered, whether correctly or incorrectly, that it had 
no other way out of a logical trap"; Sobel, ibid, at 4.  
45 This solution was pointed to by Leibniz who discussed this paradox in one of his 
papers. See Sobel, supra note 35, at 7-9. See also Peter Suber, The Paradox of Self-
Amendment: A Study of Law, Logic, Omnipotence, and Change (1990) available online 
at http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/psa/ , section 20(A). 
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While the foregoing solutions are not uniquely legal the appeal to external 
principles reflects an a-logical approach, because it does not seek to 
resolve the paradox through the introduction of further distinctions but 
rather dissolves it through an appeal to hierarchically superior normative 
principles. Thus, the court may invoke the 'good-faith' principle, and 
conclude that Protagoras’ scheme was dishonest. Alternatively, the 
contract could be revised in equity. Euathlus could be ordered to pay 
earnest money while making a reasonable effort to take on another case or 




B. PARADOXES IN THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER: THE CASES OF THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ('WTO') AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ('ICC') 
 
This section explores the deep inconsistency that is associated with the 
Westphalian scheme of validity as it is invoked in two key treaty-regimes: 
the WTO and the ICC. This deep inconsistency is generated, as we shall 
see, by the fact that both regimes cling to the traditional Westphalian 
scheme, while simultaneously introducing conflicting validation and law 
making techniques.   
 
 
1. THE CASE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ('WTO') 
 
“the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only international organization 
dealing with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to 
ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible”47.  
 
                                                 
46 See further, Suber, ibid. 
47 See, ‘The WTO... In brief‘, 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm, visited 11 March 2007. 




At first glance the WTO looks like a classic product of the Westphalian 
order. The WTO regime is the product of a complex web of treaties which 
were signed in 1994 after a long negotiation process (the Uruguay Round 
(1986-1994)).48 The constitutional core of this web consists of two 
agreements the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
('the WTO Agreement'), which is the umbrella instrument, and the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes ('the DSU'), which establishes the WTO legal system.49 
 
The WTO Agreement and the DSU include various provisions which 
allude to the Westphalian notion of validation, with its emphasis on state 
consent and the associated ideal of national sovereignty. Thus, for 
example, Article XIV of the WTO Agreement, which deals with 
'Acceptance, Entry into Force and Deposit' and Article XII, which deals 
with 'Accession', provide that accepting the authority of the WTO requires 
a formal act from the joining state. The WTO does not claim to have 
universal jurisdiction. In the same spirit Article XV, which deals with the 
issue of 'Withdrawal' states that "Any Member may withdraw from this 
Agreement". Finally, the DSU, which governs the settlement of disputes, 
includes a provision which seeks to protect the rights of the Member 
States, and to preclude the possibility that these rights will be altered by 
the WTO judicial bodies. Article 3(2) of the DSU states that (my 
emphasis): 
 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.  
The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the 
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and 
                                                 
48  World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO (2003, 3rd 
edition). 
49 The DSU is annexed to the WTO Agreement (Annex 2, Article III(3)) and thus derives 
its validity from the former agreement.   
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rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements. 
 
The Westphalian vision, reflected in the provisions quoted above, 
postulates the WTO as a highly controllable entity that is completely 
dependent on the states that have established it. Article 3(2) of the DSU 
gives the WTO judicial bodies a very limited role: they are expected 
merely to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements and to clarify their meaning. Article 3(2) thus portrays 
the WTO as a static normative space, whose contours were totally 
determined by the Member states. 
 
This portrait of the WTO system fails to appreciate, however, the highly 
autonomous character of the WTO legal system.50 It disregards the powers 
of the WTO new legal system, which - contra to the above portrait – has 
been actively shaping the normative field of the WTO – independently of 
the wishes and preferences of the Member states. This autonomy is 
formally codified in articles 23, 16:4 and 17:14 of the DSU, which jointly 
transform the WTO dispute settlement mechanism into an obligatory 
system, insulated from political intervention. In various rulings since 1995 
the WTO judicial bodies have created new rights and obligations, which 
have not existed as such before these decisions, and depart substantively 
from the legal tradition of the GATT.51  
                                                 
50 This tension is highlighted also by Sol Picciotto: "The WTO’s dispute settlement 
procedures involved a significant shift toward a more legalistic model of adjudication 
than in the GATT… Nevertheless, the legitimacy of WTO rules is still defended on the 
grounds that they have been agreed by governments". Sol Picciotto, The WTO's Appellate 
Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance, 18 Governance 477, 
495 (2005). 
51 On the norm-making powers of the WTO tribunals see Andrew Guzman, Global 
Governance and the WTO, 45 Harvard International Law Journal 303, 347 (2002), 
Picciotto, ibid and Oren Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: 
Rethinking the Trade and Environment Conflict (2004), chapter 3. Two prominent 
examples of law making by the WTO judicial bodies are the Appellate Body decision that 
both it and the panels have a wide discretion to accept amicus curiae briefs from non-state 
parties and its novel interpretation to Article XX. For a discussion of these issues see Perez, 
ibid, at 65-80, 100-105. See also paras 79-91 and 99-110 to United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 Oct 1998 
(Appellate Body Report) and paras 50-57 to European Communities - Measures Affecting 




2. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT  
 
"The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent, permanent court 
that tries persons accused of the most serious crimes of international concern, 
namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes".52 
 
A similar tension also exists in the new regime of the International 
Criminal Court ('ICC'). The ICC was created after long and protracted 
negotiations, which culminated in the adoption of the Rome Statute on 17 
July 1998.53 The Statute provides that the ICC will have jurisdiction over 
crimes of genocide, certain crimes against humanity, and certain war 
crimes. On first reading the ICC seems like another prototype of the 
Westphalian model - a treaty produced through inter-state bargaining. This 
conclusion is supported by Article 126(1) of the Rome Statute which 
stipulates that the Statute shall enter into force after the deposit of the 60th 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. This provision refers to the 
principle of 'pacta sunt servanda' as the treaty source of validity. The 
Westphalian order also underlies Article 4(2) which deals with the legal 
status and powers of the Court and provides that “The Court may exercise 
its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory of any 
State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other 
State”.54  
 
                                                                                                                         
the Prohibition of Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135, 18 September 
2000 (Appellate Body Report) ('EC-Asbestos') (on the amicus briefs question) and the 
Shrimp decision, paras. 153-159 in particular, on the interpretation of article XX.  
52 See: About the Court, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html, visited 11 March 2007. 
53 By the United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. 
54 My emphasis. 
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However, on closer inspection the ICC treaty seems to include provisions 
which visibly challenge the Westphalian validity scheme.55 This is 
reflected in the Statute’s claim to hold jurisdiction over citizens of non-
parties,56 in the establishment of new universal criminal norms which 
transcend customary international law as it existed prior to the 
establishment of the Rome Treaty,57 in the formal legal recognition of 
non-state actors (victims and NGOs),58 and finally in the decision-making 
powers which are given to the Court.59 
 
It is worthwhile to explore more closely the nearly universal jurisdiction 
which is given to the Court in Article 12. Article 12 provides the Court 
with a jurisdiction over persons who are not citizens of one of the 
signatories to the ICC. According to Article 12 the ICC has jurisdiction to 
prosecute a national of any state when crimes within the court's subject-
matter jurisdiction are committed on the territory of a state that is a party 
                                                 
55 For a more detailed discussion of the tension between the ICC regime and the 
Westpahlian validity scheme see Jackson N. Maogoto, The Final Balance Sheet? The 
International Criminal Court’s Challenges and Concessions to the Westphalian Model, 
ExpressO Preprint Series. Working Paper 1402 4, 14 (2006), Leila Nadya Sadat and 
Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 Geo. 
L.J 381, 385, 390-391 (2000) and Morris, supra note 8, at 30-33.  
56 Article 12. 
57 Articles 5-8. 
58 Through Article 15 which provides that the prosecutor may initiate investigations on 
the basis of information received from non-governmental organizations, Maogoto supra 
note 55, at 7.  
59 See, in particular Article 19(1) ("The Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in 
any case brought before it"), Article 21 (providing the court with the power to derive new 
international legal principles from "national laws of legal systems of the world" and 
Article 119(1) (endowing the Court with  the authority to settle disputes "concerning the 
judicial functions". See further Morris, supra note 8, at 30-33. 




to the treaty or that consents to ICC jurisdiction for that case.60 The court 
is thus empowered to exercise jurisdiction even in cases in which the 
defendant's state of nationality is not a party to the treaty and does not 
consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.61 The jurisdictional principle 
underlying article 12 stands in stark contrast to the constitutional principle 
of 'state consent'. This deviation is particularly striking when the ICC 
treaty is compared to the ICJ Statute and the ICJ jurisdictional 
jurisprudence.62 
 
Some proponents of the ICC Treaty have tried to explain this internal 
inconsistency within the ICC treaty by arguing that the Court's jurisdiction 
over the nationals of non-party states is based, in effect, on existing 
principles of customary international law. According to this view the ICC 
jurisdiction is based "upon the principles of universal jurisdiction pursuant 
to which the courts of any state may prosecute the nationals of any state 
for certain serious international crimes. Since any individual state could 
prosecute perpetrators regardless of their nationality, they reason, a group 
of states may create an international court empowered to do the same".63 
In a recent article Madeline Morris demonstrated convincingly that this 
thesis has no basis in contemporary customary international law. First, the 
delegated universal jurisdiction theory does not account for a number of 
crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC that are not subject 
to universal jurisdiction. Second, the intricate institutional structure which 
was established by the Rome Treaty, with the unique enforcement and 
interpretative powers it provides to the Court and the Prosecutor, creates a 
                                                 
60 This is in addition to jurisdiction based on Security Council action under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter and jurisdiction based on consent by the defendant's state of 
nationality. 
61. See on this point: Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction over 
Non-Signatory Nationals, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2000) and Morris, 
supra note 8, at 13-14. 
62 See Morris, ibid, at 20-21. 
63 See Morris, ibid, at 27-28. See also Jordan J. Paust, supra note 61 at 3. 
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legal environment which is radically different from the one envisioned by 
the decentralized model that existed prior to the establishment of the ICC. 
Thus consent to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by individual states 




IV. ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF NORMATIVE 
GROUNDING  
 
The Westphalian doctrine of validity, with its emphasis on consensual 
norm creation through state negotiation, does not seem to cohere with 
contemporary legal practices. The normative deficit that was created by 
the demise of the Westphalian scheme is being populated by alternative 
forms of validation. Four legal ideas emerge as particularly noteworthy in 
this respect and I will discuss each of them briefly: global democracy, 
deference to non-legal rationalities, direct individual consent and the new 
association between law and technology. These alternative schemes 
challenge the classic conceptions of international law, generating a new 
and deeply complex legal universe.65  However, as we consider each of 
these alternative schemes more closely it becomes obvious that the project 
of providing solid foundations to the international legal system fails not 
just because of the deep differences between these varied normative 
schemes, but also because when considered separately they yield 
inconsistencies that are as problematic as the ones generated by the 
conventional Westphalian doctrine. These horizontal and intrinsic 
paradoxes cast doubt upon the claim that these alternative doctrines 
provide a new, universal model of validity.   
                                                 
64 Some authors have tried to explain the UCC jurisdiction by appealing to universal 
moral principles. I will return to that issue below, section IV(b). 
65 This complexity cannot be captured by uni-dimensional concepts such as the 
"proliferation of international judicial bodies", Guillaume, supra note 1. For a discussion 
of this complexity in the context of UNCITRAL see Maria Panezi and Peer Zumbansen, 
'The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)', 
forthcoming in the Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2008). 






A. GLOBAL DEMOCRACY? 
 
Global democracy is invoked increasingly⎯in both theory and 
practice⎯as a new form of validation which imagines the democratic 
principle as a truly global idea, thus undercutting the role of the state. 
Unlike the idea of global democracy the Westphalian doctrine has limited 
aspirations regarding the regulation of the political process.66 The consent 
requirement underlying the Westphalian doctrine was interpreted as a 
purely formalistic condition of constitutional adequacy,67 which does not 
set substantive conditions to national political structures. Some authors 
have tried to offer a more democratic interpretation of the Westphalian 
narrative by arguing that the principle of consent should be read as a 
requirement to subject the transnational diplomatic process to a 
meaningful domestic political scrutiny. This interpretation seeks to portray 
the act of consent as a product of meaningful political deliberation.68  
However, under the Westphalian scheme the state retains the authority to 
structure the domestic political process. Further, the political model that 
emerges from this interpretation is highly fragmented – unlike the unified 
vision underlying the model of global democracy.  
                                                 
66 Thus, the only hint in the Vienna Convention to the possible tension between the 
formal consent of the state and the will of the people is indirect. Article 46 provides that:  
“(1) A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been 
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude 
treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a 
rule of its internal law of fundamental importance; (2) A violation is manifest if it would 
be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with 
normal practice and in good faith.”  (my emphasis). 
67.Id. art. 7. 
68.See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law:  
Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas, 2 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 189, 231 (1999). 
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However the model global democracy is deeply problematic in terms of its 
underlying principles and possible applications. In terms of its theoretical 
underpinnings the vision of global democratization is torn between several 
potentially conflicting commitments. The proponents of global 
democratization invoke several core commitments. First a commitment to 
inclusiveness and open decision-making structures. Second, a commitment 
to decision-making based on open and rational deliberation, geared toward 
consensual agreement. Third, a commitment to individual freedom and 
fundamental human rights. Fourth, a commitment to the value of cultural 
pluralism. And finally, a commitment to embed these core commitments 
in global governance institutions.69  
 
These commitments conflict in various ways. First, the establishment of 
strong global institutions - replacing the fragmented and relatively weak 
bodies that characterize the contemporary international order - is in 
tension with the commitment to individual freedom and cultural pluralism. 
As the distance between the global political center and the citizen-body 
grows, so does the risk that the voice of the citizen and the local 
community will be ignored.  A strong central establishment constitutes, 
therefore, a risk to individual freedom and cultural pluralism. Second, it is 
not clear whether the commitment to open deliberation and consensual 
decision-making can be realized given the vast cultural and ideological 
differences that characterize the contemporary global society. It is not 
clear what kind of criteria could guide this deliberative effort, given that 
choosing any particular criterion could jeopardize the commitment to 
pluralism. The political institutions of majority voting and parliamentary 
representation offer a way to circumvent this normative deficit, but do not 
resolve it.  
 
                                                 
69 See, David Held, Cosmopolitanism: globalization tamed? 29 Review of International 
Studies 465 (2003) and Michael Walzer International Society: What is the Best that We 
Can Do? Occasional Papers, School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study ,June 
2000, Paper Number 8. 




These dilemmas have been apparent in the few attempts to implement the 
vision of global democracy in practice. Thus, for example, in 2000, the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") made 
an ambitious attempt to develop a governance structure based on 
electronically-mediated model of representative democracy. ICANN tried 
to use the Internet to create legitimacy, first by opening its decision-
making process to the public (transparency), and second by conducting 
global, internet-based elections for its central governing body (the 'At 
Large Membership Program'). This attempt has failed however (leading 
ICANN to abandon its democratic aspirations), and was heavily criticized 
in terms of its failure to achieve true global representation and 
responsiveness to civic concerns.70  Other institutions – such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative ("GRI") – have established multi-stakeholder 
consultation processes, reflecting a commitment to consensual decision-
making.71 But despite the relative success of the GRI, it remained confined 
to a limited filed - sustainability reporting – making no claim for global 
applicability. The tensions which underlie the theoretical articulations of 
the idea of global democracy were not resolved by the few practical 
attempts to design global democratic institutions. The idea of global 
democratization remains a deeply contested notion, both in theory and in 
practice.  
 
                                                 
70 ICANN's experiment failed in the sense that ICANN has radically changed its 
governance structure, adopting a much milder concept of democracy. Nonetheless 
ICANN's experiment still constitutes an important mile stone in the attempts to transform 
the abstract idea of global democratization into a practical model. For a detailed 
discussion and critiuqe of ICANN's democratic experiment see, John G. Palfrey, The End 
of the Experiment: How ICANN’s Foray Into Global Internet Democracy Failed, 17 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 410, 412 (2004). 
71 Details about the GRI can be found at http://www.globalreporting.org. The World 
Wide Web Consortium provides another example of an attempt to design global 
standards through multi-stakeholder consultation (see http://www.w3.org/ respectively). 
The rule-making process at the International Organization for Standardization is a good 
example of a consensual structure among closed communities; see: Oren Perez, Global 
Legal Pluralism and Electronic Democracy, In R. Gibson, A. Roemmele and S. Ward 
(eds.), Electronic Democracy: Mobilisation, Organisation and Participation via New 
ICTs, (2004), pp. 133, 143. 
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 B.  DEFERENCE TO NON-LEGAL RATIONALITY  
 
The attempt to look for grounding in external, non-legal rationalities has 
been most visible in the field of human rights. The appeal to universal 
moral principles as a ground for new global legal norms is particularly 
noteworthy in two contexts: the problematic jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court and the question of humanitarian 
intervention. Thus, some authors have tried to justify the novel ICC 
jurisdiction by what amounts, in effect, to a direct appeal to moral 
principles. The ICC treaty belongs, it was argued to a new genre of treaties 
that are "globally binding because they foster the common interests of 
humanity".72 In the context of humanitarian intervention authors have 
argued for the emergence of a new grund norm: a principle of "civilian 
inviolability".73 
 
But the appeal to this new source of validity seems problematic not only 
because the choice of the pivotal norm seems somewhat arbitrary, but also 
because the meaning of the proposed norms remains deeply fuzzy. As 
Madeline Morris argued in a recent article (her argument is directed 
against the first thesis, but its logic is equally applicable to the second): "A 
threshold problem with the theory of global treaties is that there will 
                                                 
72 Morris, supra note 8, at 52.  
73 See Anne-Marie Slaughter and William W. Burke-White, An International 
Constitutional Moment 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2002). Other authors have proposed a 
different principle 'a responsibility to protect' See, e.g., Gareth Evans and Mohamed 
Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, 81 Foreign Affairs 99 (2002); Bruce, W. 
Jentleson, A Responsibility to Protect 28 Harvard International Review 18 (2007).  See 
also Held, supra note 69 (arguing for a new global order based on two meta-moral 
principles: the metaprinciple of autonomy and the metaprinciple of impartialist reasoning, 
ibid, at 471, 472). For a critique of Slaughter and Burke-White view (which is applicable 
to the other proposals), see Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Redefining Sovereignty via 
International Constitutional Moments? In Redefining Sovereignty: The Use of Force after 
the End of the Cold War. New Options, Lawful and Legitimate?, edited by M. E. 
O’Connell, M. Bothe and N. Ronzitti (2005) and Jean L. Cohen, Whose Sovereignty? 
Empire Versus International Law 18 Ethics and International Affairs 1 (2004).  




inevitably be disagreement about what in fact will serve the common 
interests of humanity. An equally formidable problem confronting the 
theory of global treaties is that, even if that which would serve the 
common interests of humanity could be dispositively identified, that alone 
would not bind states who would find unacceptable a particular 
distribution of the burdens involved in serving those interests".74 The deep 
vagueness of these new postulated norms calls for further interpretation, 
and sets the ground for interpretative disputes.75 It is not clear what criteria 
will govern such disputes and which authority will decide them. The 
suggested new grund norms do not resolve such questions.  
 
Similar appeals to non-legal rationalities can be found in other domains. 
Thus in the environmental domain we can find reference to new 
environmental ethics epitomized in the concepts of sustainable 
development76 and the precautionary principle.77 Environmental ethics 
provides an additional and independent mode of justification, operating 
alongside other forms of groundings.78 Science has also been used 
                                                 
74 Morris, supra note 8, at 52.  
75 Similar problems affflict the question of humanitarian intervention, see, e.g., the debate 
in the special issue INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY, Vol. 7(1) Spring 2001, 
http://law.ubalt.edu/cicl/ilt/ILT_VII_1.pdf. 
76 On the principle of sustainable development see, Benjamin J. Richardson and Stepan 
Wood (eds), Environmental Law for Sustainability (2006) especially chapter 1 (13-17) 
and chapter 11 (373-75). 
77 On the precautionary principle see, Richardson and Wood (eds), ibid, chapter 11 (361-
64). 
78 Thus two prominent examples are the WTO Agreement, which includes in its preamble 
a reference to the principle of Sustainable Development, and the Global Reporting 
Initiative 2006 Sustainability Guidelines, which open with a reference to the principle of 
Sustainable Development. The WTO tribunals have relied on the invocation of the 
principle of sustainability in justifying their new (pro-environment) interpretation of 
article XX; see: United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, supra note 51, at paras. 153 and 155. For a discussion of the WTO trade and 
environment jurisprudence see Perez, supra note 51, chapter 3.   
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increasingly as mode of grounding, especially and in the trade and 
environment domains.79 In both of these domains, the problems of 
choosing between the competing external sources and the indeterminacy 
of the external principles remain unresolved.80 We are confronted, again, 
not just by conflicting interpretations of the same a-legal rationality (e.g., 
environmental ethics), but also by deep uncertainty as to how these 
distinct rationalities relate to each other. There seem to be no agreement 
with respect to how these competing forms of rationality could be ranked 
and their domains of applicability defined. Indeed, there is no unified 
moral theory that could bring these different world views under a single 
umbrella in a way that would be globally accepted (successfully bridging 
between the cultural-moral disagreements that characterize the 
contemporary global society). 
 
C.  INDIVIDUAL CONSENT  
 
The doctrine of individual consent forms a third pattern of validation. The 
idea of individual consent draws both on universal principles of contract 
law and on the ethos of liberal individualism, with its strong emphasis on 
                                                 
79 A good example is the deference to science in the the WTO Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ('SPS Agreement') definition of risk 
assessment (with science rather than law provides the criteria for proper risk assessment), 
see Articles  2, 5 and Annex A(4). For a discussion, see Perez, ibid, chapter 4. The 
Climate Change Convention, provides another example, through its reliance on the work 
and judgement of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ('IPCC'). See, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/. 
80 E.g., Oren Perez, The Institutionalization of Inconsistency: from Fluid Concepts to 
Random Walk. In Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in Law, edited by O. Perez and G. 
Teubner (2006) 148-156 and Oren Perez Anomalies at the Precautionary Kingdom: 
Reflections on the GMO Panel's Decision 6 World Trade Review (Summer 2007) 1-16 
(with respect to the vagueness of the precautionary principle), and David G. Victor, 
Recovering Sustainable Development, 85 Foreign Affairs 91, 92 (2006) with respect to 
the vagueness of the sustainability paradigm (noting that "UN summits that have yielded 
broad and incoherent documents and policies. Sustainable development, the compass that 
was designed to show the way to just and viable economics, now swings in all 
directions"). 




freedom of choice and self-determination.81 This form of validation claims 
to free international law from its traditional reliance on the state as a 
necessary perquisite for the making of global norms. The concept of 
individual consent plays a particularly central role in two fields of 
international law: international arbitration and internet law. Yet, as with 
the other techniques this concept yields deep and unresolved puzzles.   
 
Consider, first, the arbitration field. An increasing number of international 
disputes are being adjudicated today in global arbitration centers. This 
trend can be attributed both to the legal regime which was created by the 
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards and to a general expansion in the number of 
international business transactions.82 The New York Convention ensures 
worldwide exclusive jurisdiction to arbitration proceedings based on valid 
arbitration agreements, provides procedures for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign awards, and limits the grounds on which domestic 
courts can refuse requests for enforcement to a few basic procedural 
defects.  The New York Convention is therefore not just a mechanism of 
enforcement; through the principle of non-interference it has facilitated the 
emergence of a new global law, which is insulated from the influence of 
inter-state politics.83  The normative space that was created by the New 
York Convention has been filled by a new a-national system of 
                                                 
81 See B. Schwartz, Self-determination. The Tyranny of Freedom, 55 American 
Psychologist  79 (2000)  and Wendy Larner, Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, 
Governmentality, 63 Studies in Political Economy 5 (2000). 
82 See Pedro Martinez-Fraga, The Convergence of Legal Cultures in Arbitration and 
Amendments to the New York Convention: If it is Not Broken, Why Fix it, but if it is 
Good, Make it Better, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 6 No. 20 
(October 2006) at 12 . Similar increase has taken place at the field of investment 
arbitration, see  Luke Eric Peterson, The Global Governance of Foreign Direct 
Investment: Madly Off in All Directions, Occasional Papers, Dialogue Globalization, N° 
19 (May 2005) at 12-14. 
83 As of 12 March 2007 the Convention had 142 parties. An updated data about the status 
of the Convention can be found at UNCITRAL web-site at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html 
(visited 12 March 2007). 
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international commercial law, the new lex mercatoria,84 and a new 
institutional apparatus, comprised of independent arbitrators and several 
permanent arbitral centers such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce International Court of Arbitration ('ICC Court'), the London 
Court of International Arbitration ('LCIA') and the US International Centre 
for Dispute Resolution.85 But trying to unfold the normative status of this 
new nexus of norms and institutions reveals a deep puzzle. How can a 
system that is based on disaggregated and discontinuous contractual 
arrangements (arbitration clauses),86 claim, simultaneously, for a 
continuous and permanent legal presence?         
 
The ICC Court constitutes a particularly fascinating example of this 
existential paradox. The ICC Court Dispute Resolution Rules87 draw their 
validity from the parties' consent.88 What is interesting with respect to the 
ICC Court is that in contrast to conventional arbitration, the ICC rules 
                                                 
84 See, for the new lex mercatoria, Alec Stone Sweet, The new Lex Mercatoria and 
Transnational Governance, 13 Journal of European Public Policy 627 (2006) and Peer 
Zumbansen, Peer, Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on Internal Affairs in 
Domestic and International Law, 15 European Journal of International Law 197 (2004). 
85 See, respectively http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration, http://www.lcia-
arbitration.com/ and http://www.adr.org. For other International Arbitration Centers see: 
http://www.constructionweblinks.com/Organizations/International__Organizations/arbitr
ation_centers.html#america (visited 20 March 2007). 
86 The reliance on arbitration clauses is reflected both in the language of the New York 
Convention, which limits its jurisdiction to valid arbitral agreements (Article II(3), and in 
the websites of the arbitral centres mentioned above which  provide their prospective 
clients with recommended arbitration clauses (see the websites of the ICC Court and 
LCIA, ibid.). A typical arbitration clause (from the ICC): "All disputes arising out of or in 
connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration 
of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in 
accordance with the said Rules." See, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4114/index.html, visited on 28 February 2007. 
87 See: http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4199/index.html. 
88 See Article 6 to the Rules. 




provide the Court with the authority to scrutinize an award.89 Under the 
ICC Rules the Arbitral Tribunal is required to submit its award in draft 
form to the Court. According to Article 27:90 
 
"Before signing any Award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall submit it in draft 
form to the Court. The Court may lay down modifications as to the form 
of the Award and, without affecting the Arbitral Tribunal’s liberty of 
decision, may also draw its attention to points of substance. No Award 
shall be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal until it has been approved by the 
Court as to its form".  
 
Commentators note that in scrutinizing the award the Court focuses on 
issues such as the completeness of the award, its adherence to the ICC 
Rules and the governing national law, internal consistency, and whether it 
is sufficiently reasoned, before authorizing its issuance to the parties.91 
Although the Court cannot compel the arbitrators to take account of its 
comments with respect to substance, arbitrators usually take notice of the 
Court's comments, at least to some extent.92 The Court does not provide 
the parties with the reasons for its decision. It seems, then, that by giving 
their consent to ICC arbitration parties give their agreement not only to 
adjudicate before an arbitrator according to the law of their choosing, but 
also to the elusive and autonomous jurisprudence of the ICC Court.93 Thus 
                                                 
89 The Court's role is defined in Article 1 of the Rules, and in Appendixes I and II thereof. 
According to Article 1(2) "The Court does not itself settle disputes. It has the function of 
ensuring the application of these Rules. It draws up its own Internal Rules (Appendix II)". 
90 According to Appendix II, Article 6 "When the Court scrutinizes draft Awards in 
accordance with Article 27 of the Rules, it considers, to the extent practicable, the 
requirements of mandatory law at the place of arbitration". 
91 Ellis Baker and Anthony Lavers, Review of Arbitrators’ Exercise of Power in English 
Law: The House of Lords Decides, 22 The International Construction Law 493 (2005). 
92 Ibid. 
93 The London Court of International Arbitration has a somewhat similar dual 
architecture; however the powers of the Court are more limited. See, the LCIR Rules of 1 
January 1998 at http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/ (in particular articles 3 and 29).  
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the ICC Court's powers and the normative force of its jurisprudence rest, 
miraculously, on the disaggregated and prospective contractual 
arrangements of its current and future 'clients'.  
 
Internet law provides another example of the invocation of individual 
consent as an independent grounding. Two prominent examples are 
ICANN's regime for the governance of disputes regarding domain 
names,94 and the World Wide Web Consortium Platform for Privacy 
Preferences Project ('P3P).95 Similarly to the world of arbitration the force 
of ICANN's dispute resolution policy and the P3P code stems from the 
direct consent of the concerned individuals – without the mediation of the 
state. In the case of ICANN's dispute settlement policy the consent is 
given in the contract signed between a domain-name holder and a 
registrar. In the case of P3P, the platform is incorporated into the 
architecture of the browsers and the websites, and consent is implied from 
the purchase or usage of the browser and its actual usage.96 The global 
                                                 
94 See, ICANN Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(http://www.icann.org/udrp/). The Policy is applicable across all gTLDs (.aero, .biz, .cat, 
.com, .coop, .info, .jobs, .mobi, .museum, .name, .net, .org, .pro, .tel and .travel). The 
policy provides for obligatory international arbitration for disputes arising from alleged 
abusive registrations of domain names (for example, cybersquatting). The arbitration 
proceedings may be initiated by a holder of trademark rights. The UDRP is a policy 
between a registrar and its customer and is included in registration agreements for all 
ICANN-accredited registrars. A list of approved dispute-resolution service providers is 
available at: http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm (visited 20 March 
2007). 
95 Available at http://www.w3.org/P3P/. The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project 
enables Websites to express their privacy practices in a standard format that can be 
retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by user agents. P3P user agents will allow 
users to be informed of site practices (in both machine- and human-readable formats) and 
to automate decision-making based on these practices when appropriate. Thus users need 
not read the privacy policies at every site they visit. Ibid. 
96 In some cases the browser is already installed in the computer when it is purchased; 
consent is then indicated through the total act of purchase.  




code is reinterpreted in these cases as a contract – a true manifestation of 
the idea of social contract.97 
 
This new form of validity finds resonance in the ideas of individual 
integrity and individual empowerment, which are central to contemporary 
Western culture. On close scrutiny, however, postulating individual 
consent as a validating force seems highly problematic. In the case of 
arbitration the gap between the disaggregated and discontinuous 
contractual consent and the permanent nature of the lex mercatoria and 
some of the new arbitral centers seems unbridgeable. In the case of the 
new internet codes, the invocation of consent does not seem to cohere with 
the traditional understanding of consent in contract law - the image of 
"two autonomous wills coming together to express their autonomy by 
binding themselves reciprocally to a bargain of exchange".98 Can one 
seriously speak about consent in the context of ICANN's policy and the 
P3P code, if the individual in question has not taken part in the negotiation 
of the code/contract in question, and in effect has no choice but to accept it 
if he wants to register a domain name or enjoy some kind of privacy 
protection as he surfs the net (recall that P3P is encoded in the architecture 
of both websites and browsers).  
 
If one rejects individual consent as an acceptable form of validation, 
perhaps there is no choice but to look for alternative groundings. Thus, in 
                                                 
97 For the idea of social contract, see: S. A. Lloyd, Hobbes's Moral and Political 
Philosophy, In E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2002) and 
Williamson M. Evers, Social Contract: A Critique 1 Journal of Libertarian Studies 185 
(1977). 
98 Margaret Jane Radin, BOILERPLATE TODAY: THE RISE OF MODULARITY AND 
THE WANING OF CONSENT 104 Michigan Law Review 1223, 1231 (2006), See further 
on the problematic of contract formation in standard electronic contracts and question of 
privacy protection Radin, ibid, Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in electronic contracting: 
minimum standards for non-negotiated contracts 42 Hous. L. Rev.  1041, 1045 (2005) 
and Lisa M. Austin, Is Consent the Foundation of Fair Information Practices? Canada's 
Experience Under PIPEDA 56 University of Toronto Law Journal 181, 191 (2006). And 
who says consent is a globally valid principle of contract formation? The idea of 
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the case of the lex mercatoria, can one appeal to universal principles of 
commercial law⎯a natural law of contracts? And in the case of ICANN’s 
UDDRP and the P3P standard, validity may reside not in the fictitious 
consent but in the process through which they were developed⎯their 
invocation of notions such as democracy and procedural justice? 
 
The increasingly blurred normative reality that characterizes the 
contemporary international legal universe provides wide occasions for 
horizontal conflicts between different forms of validation. The field of 
investment disputes provides a particularly interesting example for this 
potential tension. There is a problematic interplay between forum selection 
clauses that are included in individual investment contracts and arbitration 
procedures set out in bilateral investment treaties ('BIT') (interpreted in 
light of the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other State).99 The question raised in 
these conflicts is whether the forum selection clause can be seen as a 
waiver of BIT jurisdiction. In other words, the question is whether the 
norm of the contract trumps the norm of the treaty or vice versa. There is a 
diversity of opinions on this question.100  
 
 
D. THE BUNDLING OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
                                                 
99 For the text of ICSID treaty and details about the way in which it operates see: 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid. As at April 10, 2006, 143 countries have ratified the 
Convention (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/intro.htm, visited on 6 March 
2007). 
100 See the discussion in the ICSID cases: Aguas del Tunari et al v. Bolivia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/3 at pp. 21-30; SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, paras. 136-155 (both available from 
http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html, visited 6 March 2007) and Gerold Zeiler, 
Treaty v Contract : What is the Best Venue for Investment Disputes? Austrian Arbitration 
Yearbook 323, 332-348 (2007) and Stephan W. Schill, Arbitration Risk and Effective 
Compliance—Cost-Shifting in Investment Treaty Arbitration 7 Journal of World 
Investment & Trade 653, 676-679 (2006). 




Another highly novel source of global validity is the bundling of law and 
technology. This new technique emerged as a side effect of the 
development of digital technology that allows the bundling of software 
and norms in one digitized product.101 Such norm-in-the-machine products 
have been available in various forms for some time. One example is the 
domain of intellectual property rights (“IPR”). Instead of protecting IPR in 
a certain product (e.g., software or music) through the use of contractual 
terms or by relying on state regulation, IPR can be protected from 
violations with special software offering world-wide protection using 
various technological means.102 Such technology is being used 
increasingly in the fight against online file-sharing softwares.103 The 
Platform for Privacy Preferences Project ('P3P') provides another example. 
The P3P standard is integrated into a software (browser) and into the 
structure of web-sites (another type of machine).104 Another examples are 
new filtering softwares that are used to protect minors from exposure to 
sexually explicit materials on the web. In this case, as in the case of 
                                                 
101 Machines are understood as devices for accomplishing a task as a collection of 
functional components. See Margaret Jane Radin, ONLINE STANDARDIZATION 
AND THE INTEGRATION OF TEXT AND MACHINE, 70 Fordham Law Review 
1125, 1143 (2002). 
102 A good example is MediaMax. MediaMax is a copy-prevention software produced by 
SunnComm Technologies that is designed to prevent unauthorized copying of audio CDs 
using personal computers. See http://www.mediamaxtechnology.com/ and J. Alex 
Halderman, Analysis of the MediaMax CD3 Copy-Prevention System, Princeton 
University Computer Science Technical Report TR-679-03 (2003). 
103 The new technological weapon in this case is based on a content-recognition software, 
which makes it possible to identify copyrighted material and to block it (- unless it was 
licensed for use on the site). One of the key players in this field is Audible Magic (see, 
http://www.audiblemagic.com/ , visited 23 March 2007). See, Brad Stone and Miguel 
Helft, New Weapon In Web War Over Piracy, New York Times, 19 February 2007. 
104 On the structure of P3P technology see, further: Daniel J. Weitzner, Jim Hendler, Tim 
Berners-Lee, and Dan Connolly, Creating a Policy-Aware Web: Discretionary, Rule-
based Access for the World Wide Web. In Web and Information Security, edited by E. 
Ferrari and B. Thuraisingham. Hershey, PA Idea Group Inc (2006) at 5 (reference is to 
the posted paper available at: http://www.w3.org/2004/09/Policy-Aware-Web-acl.pdf). 
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intellectual property rights, the new software proclaims to fulfill a task that 
was previously preserved to state regulation. What is common to all these 
cases is the invocation of technology as a new type of (global) Grund 
Norm.105  
 
In Ashcroft v. ACLU106 the U.S. Supreme Court has reached a similar 
conclusion when it noted that filtering software might more effectively 
protect minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials on the Internet 
than the Child Online Protection Act ('COPA').107 This led the Court to the 
conclusion that COPA was unconstitutional (by violating the First 
Amendment) because of the availability of less restrictive alternatives.108 
The importance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in terms of this 
Article's thesis regarding the fragmentation of the idea of validity in the 
international domain lies not in the particulars of American free speech 
doctrine, but in its de facto recognition of technology as a source of 
private law.109 
 
                                                 
105 For further discussion of this phenomenon see Radin supra note 98, and Margaret Jane 
Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 
1 (2004). 
106 Ashcroft v. ACLU, No. 03-218., SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
, 540 U.S. 944, available at: http://supreme.justia.com/us/542/656/case.html.  
107 47 U. S. C. §231. 
108 Filtering software was seen as less restrictive because filters impose selective 
restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source. Under 
a filtering regime, childless adults may gain access to speech they have a right to see 
without having to identify themselves or provide their credit card information. Even 
adults with children may obtain access to the same speech on the same terms simply by 
turning off the filter on their home computers. Further, promoting filter use does not 
condemn as criminal any category of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is 
eliminated, or at least much diminished. Ibid. 
109 One can see a similar process taking place at the field of morality. See, Bruno Latour 
and Couze Venn, Morality and Technology: The End of the Means, 19 Theory Culture 
Society 247, 253-54 (2002). 




But the claim that technology acts as new form of normative grounding 
seems to confuse between the is and the ought - leaping from efficacy to 
normativity.110 This problematic has not escaped (legal) observers of 
modern technology. Thus, for example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(“EFF”) brought legal action against Sony BMG based on its distribution 
of CDs that incorporated an IPR protection software (MediaMax).111 One 
of the claims raised by EFF alleged that many consumers were not aware 
that the CDs they bought included this software and that it was 
downloaded to their computers without their consent.112 Once again, we 
see a conflict between two forms of validation: technology and individual 
consent.113    
 
 
                                                 
110 This leap characterizes the concept of legal validity in general. See: Csaba Varga, 
Validity, 41 Acta Juridica Hungarica 155 (2000) and the discussion in the following 
section. 
111 For other cases dealing with this problematic see: Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 
F.3d 630 (2005), DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA , 31 Cal. 4th 864 (2004). 
112 See the complaint filed by EFF (21 November 2005), available at: 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/sony_complaint.pdf (visited 23 March 2007). In 
response to the filing of the suit by EFF, SunnComm has taken a commitment to ensure 
that future versions of MediaMax will not install when the user declines the end user 
license agreement ("EULA") that appears when a CD is first inserted in a computer CD 
or DVD drive. SunnComm has also agreed to include uninstallers in all versions of 
MediaMax software, to submit all future versions to an independent security-testing firm 
for review, and to release to the public the results of the independent security testing. See, 
EFF, CD Copy Protection Firm Promises Fix for Software Problems, February 02, 2006, 
February 2006 News Archive, available at, 
http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2006_02.php#004378 (visited 20 March 2007). For the 
full litigation history see: http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/#docs.  
113 Radin, supra note 98, at 1231. 
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V. TAKING A STEP BACK: HAVE WE EVER BEEN 
PURE? 
 
A. PURITY REVISITED 
 
The structure of contemporary international law is clearly incompatible 
with the pure Westphalian conception of international law. Deeper 
reflection, however, exposes the purity of the Westphalian order as a 
fictitious construct, whose claim for coherence and completeness does not 
stand up to scrutiny, even if we limit its domain of applicability to the 
(distant) past. The impurity of the Westphalian scheme of validity 
becomes apparent almost immediately when considered from the 
perspective of simple logic. State will cannot be considered the ultimate 
source of international law because it leaves unanswered the question of 
the normative force of the rule that says that ‘will’ binds. Thus, the force 
of the norm “pacts must be respected” must be assumed to derive – if we 
want to avoid circularity - from a source that is independent of the will of 
states.114 This has already been noted by various scholars of international 
law. For example, Hersch Lauterpact, in a book published in 1927, 
notes:115 
 
"To say that the binding force of treaties is derived from the will of 
contracting parties who, through an act of self-limitation, give up a part of 
their sovereignty, is to leave unanswered the query why the treaty 
continues to be binding after the will of one party has undergone a change. 
The will of the parties can never be the ultimate source of the binding 
                                                 
114 See also Martti Koskenniemi, The gentle civilizer of nations : the rise and fall of 
international law, 
1870-1960 (2001) 364. 
115 See, Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law: 
With Special Reference to International Arbitration, (1927, 2002) 56-57. See also Hersch 
Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (1933) 416-420.  
Lauterpacht refers to various scholars such as Bluntschli, Bar and Anzilotti. 




force of a contract whose continued validity is necessarily grounded in a 
higher objective rule… it is the objective validity, independent of the will 
of States, of the rule pacta sunt servanda which renders legally possible the 
working of conventional international law". 
 
The attempt to resolve the question of the force of pacta sunt servanda 
through appeal to a higher customary law faces similar difficulties. At the 
level of customary international law we have to cope with the parallel 
question of the source and status of the norms regulating the making of 
customary international law. If the idea of customary international law 
regulating itself does not seem satisfactory we have no choice but to 
imagine a higher level law - an imaginary constitutional global law - 
which will be the source of such norms.116 
 
But the impurity of the Westphalian model does not lie just in its lack of 
grounding. It is also reflected in the way in which the idea of state consent 
opens up the possibility of a legal universe comprised of parallel, equal 
standing, legal regimes that are not subject to any superstructure of higher 
level law.117 This is not mere theoretical conjecture: the presidents of the 
ICJ have warned on several occasions of the risks posed by fragmentation 
and over-lapping jurisdictions, and one of them noted that "the 
proliferation of international courts may jeopardize the unity of 
international law and, as a consequence, its role in inter-State relations".118  
 
                                                 
116 For the dual hierarchy approach see Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary 
International Law, 47 American Journal of International Law 662, 665 (1953). For a 
critique see, Kammerhofer, supra note 4, at 539-40.  
117 See, Kammerhofer, supra note 4, at 549. 
118 See, the speeches of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel and Judge Gilbert Guillaume, supra 
note 1, and the speech by Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of 
Justice, to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 30 October 2001, http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresident_Guillaume_GA56_20011030.ht
m. See further on the issue of fragmentation: Martti Koskenniemi and Paivi Leino 
Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 553 (2001). 
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The search for alternative sources of validity is also not new. A prominent 
example is the appeal to morality as an independent source of international 
law. This modern phenomenon represents, so it seems, a return to the 
tradition of natural law dating back to Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). The 
natural law tradition received a renewed attention in the early 20th century, 
appearing in the academic writings of several legal scholars (in a counter-
reaction to the rise of legal positivism). Thus Hersch Lauterpacht, in his 
1927 Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law: with 
Special Reference to International Arbitration writes about a renaissance 
of natural law. He refers to several modern reconstructions of this 
tradition, invoking concepts such as "the sense of right" and "social 
solidarity". Particularly illuminating is a quote from Frederick Pollock 
(1922): "We must either admit that modern international law is a law 
founded on cosmopolitan principles of reason, a true living offshoot of the 
Law of Nature, or ignore our most authoritative expositions of it".119 
Lauterpacht has further developed this thesis in his article The Grotian 
Tradition in International Law.120 For Lauterpacht the force of the Grotian 
tradition stems from the intrinsic insufficiency of the conception of 
international law as derived from state will and from the constant need to 
judge its adequacy in the light of ethics and reason.121 It seems, then, that 
international law has never been pure. Neither is the search for alternative 
groundings a new phenomenon.  
 
                                                 
119 Lauterpacht (1927, 2002), supra note 115 at 58-59, fn 7. 
120 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT'L L. 1 (1946). Another important figure in the revival of the Grotian tradition was 
Cornelius van Vollenhoven, especially in his Three Stages in the Evolution of 
International Law (1919). See Renee Jeffery, Hersch Lauterpacht, the Realist Challenge 
and the ‘Grotian Tradition’ in 20th-Century International Relations 6 European Journal 
of International Relations 223, 224 (2006). 
121 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 408. Lauterpacht argues in that spirit that "the 
acceptance of the law of nature as an independent source of international law" is one of 
the precepts of modern international law, Lauterpacht, ibid, at 51. See, further C. Wilfred 
Jenks, Hersch Lauterpacht: the Scholar as Prophet, 36 British Yearbook of International 
Law 1, 72 (1960) and Jeffery, ibid at 237-241.   





B. THE PROBLEM OF GROUNDING IN LAW AND THE TRUTH-
TELLER PARADOX  
 
The problem of grounding is a measure of the deep indeterminacy that is 
part and parcel of the concept of law in both its municipal and 
international realizations. The question of grounding does not afflict just 
the Westphalian scheme of consent – it is common to all the forms of 
validity which were considered above. . Whenever a new source of 
validity is invoked as an alternative to the Westphalian paradigm the 
question of its own justification remains lying in the air in a mist of 
arbitrary articulations. In considering this problematic it is interesting to 
consider a similar puzzle that arises in the filed of semantics – the truth-
teller paradox. Consider the following sentence: 
 
K1 This sentence is true  
 
We can use the structure of this sentence to produce a truth-telling 
sequence (with each sentence belonging to the domain of its 
predecessor):122 
 
1 The next sentence is true 
2 The next sentence is true 
3 The next sentence is true 
 
Initially, one may take these truth-telling sentences as unproblematic. 
Indeed, these sentences do not generate the kind of semantic instability 
that characterizes liar-like sentences. However, upon reflection, this 
conclusion seems hasty. In this case (as with the liar-like statements), the 
sentences involved can consistently be assigned conflicting true/false 
values. This makes them hopelessly undetermined.123 The distinction 
                                                 
122 This example is taken from Hans Herzberger, Paradoxes of Grounding in Semantics 
67 The Journal of Philosophy 145, 150 (1970). See also Roy Sorensen, Future Law: 
Prepunishment and the Causal Theory of Verdicts, 40 Nous 166, 176 (2006). 
123 Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge, Dialetheism, Semantic Pathology, 
and the Open Pair 84 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 395, 397 (2006). 
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between the Liar Paradox and the Truth-Teller paradox is thus that in the 
former the problem is that there is no consistent assignment of truth-
values, while in the latter the problem is that there are too many consistent 
assignments (thus any assignment must involve an arbitrary choice as to 
which truth-value should be assigned). 124 
 
The notion of validity produces in law something which is akin to the 
truth-teller paradox. Validity is the qualifying mark or label of legal 
norms.125 It distinguishes between the law (rules) in force and that which 
is not law. In other words: ‘Law which is not valid is not law’.126 
Determining the validity of norms is thus of critical importance; it is 
essential to the formation of normative expectations and is also a critical 
component of legal decision-making. It is the validity of the law that 
makes its normative statements binding. While non-legal prescriptive 
statements also 'purport' to be binding they invoke other reasons for their 
'bindingness'.127 But validity is not only a mark unique to law; it can only 
be endowed and transferred according to law. The concept of validity thus 
holds an inevitable circularity: Validity can only be determined 
recursively, that is, by reference to valid law.128 Because norms cannot be 
evaluated through the logical prism of truth and falsity, the concept of 
validity can operate as a plausible alternative.129 Consider, for example, 
the following set of rules (“the Paradox of Validity”): 
                                                 
124 See, Roy Sorensen, Vagueness and Contradiction (2001) at 167. See also Herzberger, 
supra note 21, at 150 
125 Csaba Varga, Validity, 41 Acta Juridica Hungarica 155, 155. 
126 See Luhmann, above n 40, at 125.  
127 See Vranas, supra note 34, at section 3, for a discussion of the notion of bindingness. 
128 See Luhmann, ibid, at 128 and Varga, supra note 110, at 155-6. 
129 See, on that also, Vladimir Svoboda, Forms of Norms and Validity 80 Poznan Studies 
in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 223, 229 (2003). As in classical 
logic, I assume bivalence, ie, a binary distinction between valid/not-valid. While validity 
resembles in some aspects the notion of truth, it does not generate the same kind of 
paradoxes. Thus, for example, the notion of validity does not yield a paradox parallel to 





Rule 1.1: This rule, and all the rules enumerated below, are valid. 
Rule 2.1. … 
Rule 2.2 … 
Rule 2.3. … 
… 
Rule 2.n. …   
 
This sequence of rules can have (at least) two consistent assignments of 
validity values. The first, in which both the Rule 1.1 (‘meta rule’) and all 
the other rules (‘secondary rules’) are valid, and another one, in which 
both the meta rule and all the secondary rules are invalid.130 The Truth-
Teller Paradox generates a similar problem of multiple (consistent) 
assignments of truth and falsity. 
 
                                                                                                                         
the liar. Consider the following example: Imagine that you open the Civil Code which is 
in force in your country. In page 100 to the Code you find rule number 499 which states: 
 
499. This rule is not valid. 
 
What is the meaning of this sentence? Consider, first, the option that rule 499 is valid, 
that is, it represents the law in force. If it is valid, then what it says is valid as well, and 
since it says about itself that it is not valid, this must be valid as well. Contradiction. 
Assume, alternatively, that rule 499 is not valid. Then, what it says about itself is indeed 
the case, and no contradiction arises. (Strictly speaking, if a rule is not valid, what it says 
is legally irrelevant.) Unlike the Liar Paradox, there is a simple way out here, which 
requires us to assume that rule 499 is not valid. This leaves us with the riddle of how and 
why this sentence was incorporated into the Code in the first place. 
130 The qualification ‘at least’ is necessary, because once we assume that the Meta rule is 
not valid, there can be multiple assignments of validity, which attribute different values to 
the Secondary rules.  
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Note, however, that there are important differences between the paradox 
of validity and the truth-teller paradox. In the context of the latter it is 
possible to argue that the sentences included in the truth teller sequence, 
are vacuous or under-specified. This reflects the fact that these sentences 
do not supply a concrete truth-condition by which their truth or falsity may 
be determined. They fail to yield a statement.131 The parallel legal 
sequence is not vacuous. Even if we consider it invalid its deontic content 
is not lost. The normative statements simply lose the colour of law. They 
become non-legal norms.  
 
The foregoing paradox reflects one of the deepest dilemmas of modern 
law: On the one hand, we feel uncomfortable with the thought that law 
validates itself; on the other hand, this is exactly what is expected from the 
law according to the modern conception of validity – that is, that validity 
can only be endowed according to law. The assumption that the criteria 
and authority for determining the validity of norms must be instituted 
through valid law thus generates a vicious circularity, which seems to be 
logically irresolvable.  
 
At this point, it might make sense to turn to philosophy. Perhaps we can 
gain some inspiration from the various strategies invoked by philosophers 
to resolve the puzzle of semantical paradoxes. Let me briefly sketch some 
of the attempts to resolve these paradoxes.132 Alfred Tarski proposed to 
resolve the puzzle of the liar paradox by replacing our everyday, singular 
understanding of truth with a multi-level linguistic framework. According 
to this construction, one is able to speak meaningfully about the truth of 
statements in one language (the ‘object-language’) only in a language that 
                                                 
131 Transforming K1 into a bi-conditional thus yields the following vacuous sentence: K1 
is true if and only if K1 is true. In contrast, in proper statements such transformation 
makes perfect sense. Consider: K2  Leaves are green. The sentence K2 is true if and only 
leaves are green is fully specified. See further Laurence Goldstein, Fibonacci, Yablo, and 
the Cassationist Approach to Paradox 115 Mind 867, 884-5 (2006). 
132 For a general discussion, see, eg, Sainsbury, above n 9 and Rescher, above n 8. An 
important solution strategy which I will not discuss is based on rejecting (some) of the 
assumptions of classical logic (eg, the law of excluded middle). For this approach, see, 
for example, G Priest, ‘What Is So Bad about Contradictions’ (1998) 95 The Journal of 
Philosophy 410.  




is located higher on the linguistic hierarchy than the object language and 
whose expressive capacities are essentially richer (the ‘meta-language’).133  
 
Another approach takes as given the non-hierarchical character of natural 
language. It proposes to resolve the riddle of the liar and truth-teller 
paradoxes by arguing that groundless sentences are intrinsically ill-
formed, and should be excluded from the realm of statements – statement 
being understood as a sentence that is used to say something true or 
false.134 Groundless sentences, it is argued, while grammatically correct, 
fail to make any statement; they are, in other words, ‘truth-incompetent’. 
And since these sentences are truth-incompetent, it makes no sense to ask 
whether they are true or false.135 Laurence Goldstein argues that the reason 
why liar-like sentences generate such awe and confusion is not because of 
any deep logical problematic, but rather, because of certain deep-seated 
beliefs and preconceptions that characterize human thought. Underlying 
the semantical paradoxes is our naïve intuition that ‘the paradoxical 
sentences because they are not ungrammatical, vague or sortally suspect 
and encompass no false presuppositions, must yield statements when 
used’.136 The analysis of these paradoxes thus seems to belong more to the 
realm of psychology than to the realm of logic.  
 
In effect, the foregoing approaches introduce, though for different reasons, 
a general ban on self-reference and other forms of groundlessness. 
However, this ban may seem too strict for and incongruent with our 
intuitions regarding the use of language. An alternative approach is offered 
                                                 
133 Alfred Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics 
(1944) 3 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 341, at 350-1. 
134 Statement, following Goldstein, is understood as ‘a truth-bearer, a used sentence – 
“used” not in the sense just of being uttered out loud (a pheme) or written down (a 
grapheme) but in the sense of being used to say something true or false’ Goldstein, above 
n 30, at 54. 
135 Goldstein, ibid, at 58.   
136 Ibid, at 69. 
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by the model of naïve semantics, articulated by Hans Herzberger. The 
essence of this approach is the following:  
 
In naive semantics, paradoxes are allowed to arise freely and to work their 
own way out. No semantic defences are to be set up against them. … No 
effort will be made to eliminate the paradoxes, to suppress them, or in any 
way to interfere and take deliberate action against them. They are to 
unfold according to their own inner principles. In its early stages naive 
semantics may appear somewhat haphazard and even chaotic. Gradually 
some islands of stability will emerge and grow until eventually everything 
has resettled into a new but orderly arrangement.137  
 
Instead of trying to break or suppress the semantic instability associated 
with semantical paradoxes – their oscillation between true and false – 
naive semantics calls us to embrace it. This can be achieved by exposing 
the pattern through which paradoxical statements change their value at 
different stages of evaluation.138 Naïve semantics thus rejects any attempt 
to classify liar-like sentences as neither true nor false or both true and 
false. Their fundamental semantic character is neither a truth value nor the 
absence of a truth value, but a valuational pattern that has certain 
regularities. By demonstrating that paradoxical sentences follow certain 
regularities, naïve semantics shows ‘how a language could contain 
                                                 
137 Herzberger, above n 22, at 482.   
138 This valuation technique consists of two phases: ‘Each statement undergoes two 
phases of evaluation, either of which can be trivially simple or, within fixed bounds, 
extremely complicated. Each statement can be assigned two characteristic ordinal 
numbers: a stabilization point and a fundamental periodicity. The stabilization point for a 
statement marks the earliest stage at which its valuations become periodic, and its 
periodicity marks the length of its valuational cycle’, Herzberger, ibid, at 492. Thus, for 
example, the looped liar that was discussed above (the Plato-Socrates dialogue) is cyclic 
with periodicity 4. Starting with the assumption that Plato’s statement is true leads you to 
conclude that Socrates’ statement is true, next that Plato’s statement is in fact false, 
Socrates’ statement is false, returning to the original evaluation that Plato’s statement is 
true. So if we attribute the values (1, 0) to (true, false) we get the following cyclical 
pattern: 11001100… .    




paradoxical statements and nevertheless have a systematic and coherent 
semantic structure’.139  
 
What are the implications of the philosophical struggle with semantical 
paradoxes to the study of the paradox of validity? Consider, first, Tarski’s 
hierarchical conception of truth. To apply Tarski’s proposal to law, one 
would have to assume a hierarchy of laws in which the validity of the 
lower-level normative layer could only be determined through the prism of 
a higher law. This hierarchical conceptualization of validity is 
inconsistent, however, with our practical experience of law as a unitary 
system. So maybe, following the philosophical strategy of barring 
groundless sentences, we should impose a ban on groundless normative 
structures? This solution raises many difficulties: first, because the idea 
that validity should only be endowed according to law has deep roots in 
the moral and political culture of the Western world, and second, because 
it is not clear what constitute a proper grounding for a global norm.  
 
The answer to the question of legal paradoxicality lies elsewhere, and 
requires, as will be argued below, a conceptual switch. This alternative 
approach has some resonance with the dynamic vision of naïve semantics.  
 
 
C. THE PRAXIS OF PARADOX: FROM PURITY TO SYSTEM 
DYNAMICS  
 
Exploring the puzzle of legal paradoxes requires a departure from the 
philosophical and logical approach to the study of paradoxes. The 
philosophical inquiry has been guided by the idea that paradoxes represent 
a certain malady of thought that should somehow be eliminated, prevented 
                                                 
139 Herzberger, ibid, at 497 
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or resolved.140 One of the main tasks of logic is to free us from this 
disease.141  
 
The philosophical approach is not applicable to law because the notion of 
paradox – in its philosophical and logical connotations – does not apply to 
law in its social instantiation.142 This has to do with the fact that paradoxes 
are properties of sentences.143 Because law, as a social system, is not 
reducible to sentences (eg, norms), it cannot be, strictly speaking, 
‘paradoxical’ - although it can be depicted as self-referential, self-
organizing or self-producing.144 The paradoxes of law emerge as sentential 
                                                 
140 Thus, Alfred Tarski has noted in one of his papers: ‘The appearance of an antinomy is 
for me a symptom of disease’; Alfred Tarski, Truth and Proof, 220 Scientific American 
63, 66 (1969). 
141 Nicholas Rescher observes: The ‘prime directive of rationality is to restore consistency 
in such situations’. Rescher, supra note 12, at 9; see also Chihara, supra note 13, at 590-
1. 
142 The gap between the logical and legal planes remained unnoticed by some legal 
scholars. Thus, for example, George Fletcher, in his article on ‘Paradoxes in Legal 
Thought’, notes: "This Article commits itself to logical consistency as the indispensable 
foundation for effective dialogue and coherent criticism. Only if we accept consistency as 
an overriding legal value will we be troubled by the paradoxes and antinomies that lie 
latent in our undeveloped systems of legal thought. Grappling with uncovered paradoxes 
and antinomies will impel us toward consistent theoretical structures". George P. 
Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 Columbia Law Review 1263, 1264-5 (1985).  
143  I use the term ‘sentence’ to denote a string of words satisfying the grammatical 
rules of a language (see the WordNet 2.0 dictionary, available at 
http://wordnet.princeton.edu). This broad definition includes sentences in the form of 
both statements and norms. Statements (or claims), unlike norms, are truth-bearers; they 
can be true or false, see Goldstein, above n 30, at 54.  
144 One of the key lessons of the social analysis of law is the understanding that the 
essence of law cannot be captured by simply enumerating its normative content. This 
point has been forcefully made by Gunther Teubner and Niklas Luhmann. Describing the 
law as a system of rules or a system of symbols, Teubner argues, provides no answer to 
the dynamic property of law, to its self-regulatory capacity: ‘For how are norms to 
produce norms or symbols to generate symbols? We can only conceive of the law 
producing itself if we understand it no longer as a mere system of rules but as a system of 
actions’, Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (1997) at 18. See, further, on 




reflections of its unique systemic structure: of its self-organizing and self-
producing features. A self-organizing system is a system that not only 
regulates or adapts its behaviour, but creates its own organization. Self-
production (or autopoiesis) denotes the process by which a system 
recursively produces its own network of components (in the case of law: 
communication ordered by the distinction legal/illegal), thus continuously 
regenerating its essential organization in the face of external perturbations 
and internal erosion.145 Self-organizing and self-producing systems are 
intrinsically circular and self-referential.146 
 
Recognizing that the paradoxes of law are reflections of its unique 
systemic structure indicates that the notion of purity does not provide a 
suitable guide for the study of legal paradoxicality.147 One cannot purify 
the law from its paradoxes, because they reflect vital steering and 
stabilizing mechanisms, without which the law would not be able to 
                                                                                                                         
that point, Niklas Luhmann, Law As a Social System (2004), at 98-105, 177 and Neil 
MacCormick, Norms, Institutions, and institutional Facts, 17 Law and Philosophy 301, 
330-1 (1998). 
145 See Francis Heylighen, ‘The Science of Self-organization and Adaptivity’ in The 
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS Publishers, 2001), available at 
http://www.eolss.net, and Francis Heylighen and Cliff Joslyn, ‘Cybernetics and Second 
Order Cybernetics’, in RA Meyers (ed.), Encyclopedia of Physical Science & Technology 
vol 4 (3rd ed) (2001) 155-170. 
146 In mathematical terms these forms of circularity can be modelled by an equation 
representing how some phenomenon or variable y is mapped onto itself by a 
transformation or process f: y = f(y). To make sense of this equation one needs to 
explicate what y and f stand for. For a more detailed analysis see, Heylighen and Joslyn, 
ibid, at section III(A).  
147 The notion of purification is invoked, for example, by Nicholas Rescher, see Rescher, 
supra note 12, at 31. Rescher himself provides some support for the foregoing thesis in 
his distinction between the practical and theoretical contexts. In practical contexts, 
Rescher argues, ‘there is a possibility of compromise – of affecting a division that enables 
us in some way and to some extent “to have it both ways”, say, to proceed A-wise on 
even days and B-wise on odd ones. But we cannot rationally do this with beliefs. In 
theoretical contexts we must choose – must resolve the issue on way or another’, 
Rescher, ibid, at 11.   
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counteract external pressures.148 The static perspective which characterises 
the study of paradoxes in logic is not suited for that task because it is not 
sensitive to the social dynamics underlying the paradoxes of law.149 The 
circular quality of the concept of validity is therefore an inevitable feature 
of legal communication. This circularity does not undermine the 
normative unity of the legal system because the mark of validity is taken 
for granted in the recursive operations of the law.150 Further, in functional 
terms this circularity provides the law with far-reaching flexibility – by 
empowering it to create and destruct normative structures in response to 
conflicting social pressures.  
 
 
VI. THE POLYMORPHOSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS 
 
The groundlessness of law is not, then, a new problem. Still I will argue 
that the paradoxicality of the contemporary system of international law 
constitutes a novel phenomenon. What is unique in the structure of the 
international legal system is not the impurity of our forms of validation, 
but the emergence of multiple validating techniques, which are invoked, 
                                                 
148 It is simply wrong, therefore, to view consistency, as Fletcher does, ‘as an overriding 
legal value’ (although the appearance of consistency – concealing the paradox – could 
have instrumental value). 
149 A notable exception is naïve semantics, which as we saw earlier, emphasises the 
dynamic aspect of semantical paradoxes. See also Patrick Grim, Gary Mar, Paul St. 
Denis, The Philosophical Computer: Exploratory Essays in Philosophical Computer 
Modeling (1998), chapter 1. However these attempts, which are based on the idea of 
iterated functional sequences, do not capture the innovative feature of the law – its 
capacity to produce unpredictable surprises.   
150 This is why law cannot include a right to revolution. This idea was nicely captured by 
an old English verse dealing with the paradox of treason (quoted by Josef Kunz): 
"Treason cannot prosper, What's the reason? For if it does, who would dare to call it 
treason?"; Josef L. Kunz, Revolutionary Creation of Norms of International Law, 41 The 
American Journal of International Law 119, 121 (fn. 6) (1947). 




simultaneously, at the forefront of the international legal body. The global 
legal system has moved from a state of (imaginary) purity to a state of 
multiple paradoxicalities – a process of polymorphosis – leading to a much 
more complex juridical universe. But what are the social implications of 
this process? In order to answer this question, let me first outline the key 
types of deep inconsistencies that afflict the contemporary universe of 
international law. 
 
 Horizontal inconsistent sources of validation. There is no 
universally agreed concept of validity. Different international regimes use 
different notions of validity (compare the World Trade Organization 
regime to the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of 
Arbitration). In some cases this form of inconsistency leads to trans-
regime conflicts (e.g., the clash between treaty and contractual obligations 
in the investment domain, and the clash between consent and technology 
in Internet law). 
 Internal inconsistency. Within the same legal regime it is possible 
to find conflicting conceptions of validity, pulling in different directions 
(e.g., the cases of the WTO and the International Criminal Court). 
 The incorporation of vague sources of validity (from morality to 
science). Vagueness yields conflicting interpretations both within 
particular regimes and across regimes (e.g., the new principle of 'civilian 
inviolability' and the 'precautionary principle'). 
 
Together these multiple inconsistencies bring forth a legal universe whose 
complexity is multidimensional. The complexity of modern international 
law cannot be captured through reference to the heterogeneous 
institutional reality of multiple legal tribunals. Its complexity runs deeper, 
covering many layers of legal praxis and challenging the traditional 
boundaries and tenets of international law (such as the distinction between 
public and private international law). But what are the possible 
repercussions of the polymorphosis process? In the following sections I 
want to explore this question by considering the influence of the 
polymorphosis process on the structure and autonomy of the global legal 
system, on its stability and its relationship with other systems of 
governance, and on its external legitimacy. Responding to these questions 
requires us to move from the realm of historic-analytic analysis into the 
realm of futuristic socio-legal analysis. This move also makes the 
following discussion much more explorative (even speculative). 
 
 




A. FROM COLONIZATION TO INTERNAL COMPLEXIFICATION: THE 
EMERGENCE OF COSMOPOLITAN LAW 
 
The polymorphosis process can be postulated as a reflection of the 
colonization, or instrumentalization of the global legal system by 
multifarious external systems.151 There are certainly voices who argue that 
this colonization is wide-spread, with the finger being pointed in particular 
to the global economic system or the so called 'Washington consensus'. 
Economic rationality and economic institutions (in all their different 
embodiments, public and private) it is argued, are actually calling the 
shots; the law – from the WTO to the climate change convention – 
operates as a mere façade for economic calculations and corporate 
interests.152 While this argument has some merit I do not find it convincing 
as an explanation for the diverse processes depicted above.  There are two 
                                                 
151 For the risk of the colonization of global law by external sources see, eg, Fischer-
Lescano, supra note 73. 
152 See, e.g. David Held, Globalisation: the Dangers and the Answers, openDemocracy, 
27 May 2004  http://www.opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/1918.pdf; WILLIAM 
FINNEGAN, The Economics of Empire: Notes on the Washington Consensus, Harper's 
Magazine May 2003, http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/2003/Economics-Of-
EmpireMay03.htm; Noam Chomsky, The Passion for Free Markets Exporting American 
values through the new World Trade Organization, 
http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/may97chomsky.html. Noam Chomsky provides a 
proto-typical formulation of the colonization argument. Referring to the WTO agreement 
on telecommunications he argues that "the 'new tool' allows the U.S. to intervene 
profoundly in the internal affairs of others, compelling them to change their laws and 
practices. Crucially, the WTO will make sure that other countries are 'following through 
on their commitments to allow foreigners to invest' without restriction in central areas of 
their economy. In the specific case at hand, the likely outcome is clear to all: 'The 
obvious corporate beneficiaries of this new era will be U.S. carriers, who are best 
positioned to dominate a level playing field' (ibid). In a similar fashion the bundling of 
law and technology can be viewed as an "automatic" mechanism, which is controlled by 
private firms - and serves their interests. Margaret Radin has argued recently that this new 
form of machine-implemented self-enforcement reflects the replacement of the law of the 
legislature by the law of the firm; Radin, supra note 98, at 1233.   




main reasons for my skepticism. First, the diversity and complexity of the 
different validation techniques – reflecting both their horizontal 
incompatibilities and their internal fuzziness – makes this argument 
unconvincing. The empirical argument that served to reject Kunz's purity 
thesis, by questioning its coherence, likewise serves to reject this totalistic 
Marxist critique (by similarly questioning its coherence). Second, the 
search for grounding, which underlies all of the forms of validation 
discussed in section IV, reflects a common adherence to the concept of 
'normativity'. Indeed the quest for validity can only make sense within the 
realm of law.153 
 
The polymorphosis process represents therefore something else - an 
internally generated process of complexification. It is a purely internal 
phenomenon: an internally driven reconstruction of law's groundings with 
the law reacting – but not yielding - to external sources. 154 The appeal to 
democracy, science, morality, direct consent and technology does not 
signal the colonization of law but, rather, an extension of the horizon of 
possibilities through which international law, in its various realizations, 
can react to external pressures. But the polymorphosis process represents a 
deeper message. It brings forth a new kind of global law – a truly 
cosmopolitan phenomenon. The unity of this new body of global laws 
does not derive from the ideal of national sovereignty or from some 
projected global hierarchy;155 rather, it is constituted through a common 
appeal to the concepts of normativity and grounding – which are 
postulated as universally applicable distinctions.  
 
                                                 
153 See, Varga, supra note 110, at 164. 
154 This does not mean that the question of the grounding of law is not discussed in non-
legal domains, such as politics or philosophy; however, from internal perspective this 
external deliberation appears as noise.     
155 Hence it is no longer true to argue that "national sovereignty is the condition of global 
law and global law is the condition of sovereignty being possible". eg, Fischer-Lescano, 
supra note 73, at section V. Neither can such unity be found in the International Court of 
Justice as the apex of some postulated hierarchy. See, Koskenniemi and Leino, supra 
note 118, at 577. 
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B. PARADOX, DIVERSITY AND RESILIENCE  
 
The polymorphosis process does not seem to reflect, then, the subjugation 
of the law by external forces. However, the impact of this process on the 
functional operation of the law, and on its relationship with other systems 
of governance, still constitutes an unresolved problematic. This 
problematic raises two questions: first, could the multiple forms of self-
reference and inconsistencies associated with the polymorphosis process 
lead to irresolvable conflicts within and between regimes, bringing 
ultimately to the total paralysis of the global legal system?156 Second, and 
in light of this possibility, could the entanglement of the law in its internal 
paradoxes lead to the expansion of other social systems (economics, 
politics, morality and religion), leading simultaneously to the contraction 
of global law as problems migrate to other systems?  
 
Systems theory recognizes operational paralysis and structural 
disintegration as a possible trajectory in the life of ecological and social 
systems.157 However, this conjecture is not the most plausible account of 
the future direction of the contemporary global legal system. I argue that 
the complexity and diversity of contemporary body of law⎯the 
proliferation of validation techniques⎯should be seen, at this point, as a 
source of strength rather than weakness. This complexity contributes to the 
                                                 
156 For this possibility see: Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime-
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 999 (2004) and Greg C. Shaffer and Mark 
A. Pollack, Regulating Risk in a Global Economy: The United States, Europe, and 
Agricultural Biotechnology, (forthcoming), chapter 1. 
157 See, e.g., Folke, et al. REGIME SHIFTS, RESILIENCE, AND BIODIVERSITY IN 
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, 35 Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and 
Systematics 557, 567; Ahmet E. 
Kideys, Fall and Rise of the Black Sea Ecosystem 297 (5586) Science 1482 (2002); Brian 
Walker  and Jacqueline A. Meyers, Thresholds in Ecological and Social–Ecological 
Systems: a Developing Database, 9 Ecology and Society 3, 12 (2004). 




resilience of the global legal system and enhances its ability to respond to 
external pressures. The legal anxiety associated with the possibility of 
regime-collisions and normative contradictions158 confuses the micro level 
(the ramifications of a local dispute, e.g., between the WTO regime and 
the Kyoto Protocol) and the macro level – the resilience of the global legal 
system in its totality.  
 
This argument draws on the study of the relation between system-
resilience and diversity in ecology. The concept of resilience is used in 
ecology to denote the width or limit of a stability domain of an ecological 
system and is defined by the "magnitude of disturbance that a system can 
absorb before it changes stable states".159 Bio-diversity is defined as a 
measure of two features of ecological system: functional-group diversity 
and functional-response diversity. Functional-group diversity measures the 
diversity of the eco-system in terms of groups of species that fulfill 
different functions (e.g., species may pollinate, graze, predate, fix 
nitrogen, etc.). The persistence of functional groups contributes to the 
performance of ecosystems and the services that they generate. Loss of a 
major functional group, such as apex predators, may cause drastic 
alterations in ecosystem functioning. Functional-response diversity is 
defined in terms of the diversity of responses to environmental change 
among species that contribute to the same ecosystem function. Variability 
in responses to environmental change within the same functional group is 
critical to ecosystem resilience.160  
 
                                                 
158 See, for example, in Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, supra note 156 and Rosalyn 
Higgins, A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, Keynote speech given 
by President Rosalyn Higgins at the Spring Meeting of the International Law Association 
on 4 March 2006, 55 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 791 (2006), at 792. 
159 See: Lance Gunderson, Ecological Resilience - In Theory and Application, 31 Annu. 
Rev. Ecol. Syst. 425, 427 (2000). Folke et al define resilience similarly as "the capacity 
of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to retain 
essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks"; Folke et al, ibid, at 558. 
160 Folke et al, ibid, at 570. 
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There is an increasing consensus among ecologists that bio-diversity 
contributes to systems resilience by increasing sources of renewal and 
reorganization and by providing a rich response horizon.161 Generally 
biodiversity provides a cross-scale resilience. Species combine to form an 
overlapping set of reinforcing influences, spreading risks and benefits 
widely, and thus retaining overall consistency in performance, 
independent of wide fluctuations in the individual species.162 Diversity is 
thus postulated as an evolutionary achievement. 
 
Applying biological concepts to the study of social processes is not a 
trivial exercise. The following comments constitute a first step in a more 
wide-ranging investigation of the applicability of this biological research 
to the social sciences.163  In the context of law, resilience may be 
understood in terms of the capacity of the legal system to withstand 
external colonization attempts (reflecting a shift from autonomy to 
allonomy)164 or its capacity to maintain a certain level of communicative 
activity (with different levels representing different states). The diversity 
of validation techniques constitutes a form of functional-response 
diversity. It provides the law with multiple avenues to respond to external 
                                                 
161 Folke et al, ibid, at 572. 
162 Gunderson, supra note 159, at 431. The distribution of functional diversity within and 
across scales allows regeneration and renewal to occur following ecological disruption 
over a wide range of scales (with scale defined as a range of spatial and temporal 
frequencies, Garry Peterson, Craig R. Allen and C. S. Holling, Ecological Resilience, 
Biodiversity, and Scale, 1 Ecosystems 6, 11, 16 (1998)). 
163 For other attempts to use biological ideas in the study of social systems, see: Niklas 
Luhmann, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (1995) (the idea of autopoiesis, 12-58, 34-36 in particular) 
and Francis Heylighen, supra note 145, at 24 (the concept of self-organization).   
164 Allonomy, literally meaning external law, refers to the situation in which a system is 
regulated or controlled from outside; Francisco J. Varela, F. J. Principles of Biological 
Autonomy, (1979) xi. 




pressures, maintaining, nonetheless its normative unity (against competing 
social orders).165 
 
This diversity – which in the legal domain is translated into paradoxical 
tensions at the meta-normative level - has advantages at both the micro-
regime level and the macro-meta-system level. Let me give a few concrete 
examples. In the case of the WTO, the friction between the autonomy of 
the legal system and its apparent commitment to the Westphalian 
paradigm allows the law to proceed with its internally driven conceptual 
innovation while still relying on the legitimacy produced by the ideal of 
state consent.166 The reference to external validating sources – such as 
science and environmental ethics – further enriches the response horizon 
of WTO law. In the case of the lex mercatoria, the tension between 
disaggregated contractual sources and a permanent institutional and 
doctrinal apparatus allows the law to develop deep sensitivities to the 
needs of the global economic system  within a stable institutional 
infrastructure, which provides the system with memory and coherence 
(despite its underlying fragmented foundations). The reliance on (and 
development of) universal private law doctrines, operating as a common 
conceptual grid, constitutes a further source of validity and stability. At the 
meta-regime level, the interplay between the different validation sources 
allows the legal system to respond to multiple social needs despite 
political and economic constraints. Thus, for example, the Global 
Reporting Initiative, by invoking the principles of consensual decision 
making and sustainable development, has initiated successfully a new 
global scheme dealing with corporate reporting in a field in which the 
conventional treaty-making route would have faced formidable obstacles. 
 
The lesson from the biological discussion of diversity and resilience seems 
to be clear: there is a value in diversity in both its institutional and 
normative dimensions. In terms of institutional design, this suggests, I will 
                                                 
165 Diversity contributes, therefore, to the continuance of (transnational) legal 
communication (see, Heylighen & Joslyn, supra note 145, at section IV(A)). To the 
extent that law is taken as a better way for resolving societal conflicts (e.g., relative to 
force) this result has important moral value. 
166 See, Picciotto, supra note 50, at 496 in particular. 
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argue, a shift from models of institutional hierarchy and normative unity to 
reflexive models, which maintain this diversity and the paradoxical 
frictions associated with it.167 I will say more about that in section VII  
 
 
C. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GLOBAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
Finally a key question is to what extent the paradoxes of validity influence 
the (external) legitimacy of international law. This question requires us to 
distinguish between moral and sociological understandings of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy in the moral, normative sense refers to the right to rule. Allen 
Buchanan and Robert Keohane argue that in the case of global institutions 
the right to rule should be understood to mean "both that institutional 
agents are morally justified in making rules and attempting to secure 
compliance with them and that people subject to those rules have moral, 
content-independent reasons to follow them and/or to not interfere with 
others’ compliance with them".168 Legitimacy in a sociological sense is a 
measure of belief. From a sociological perspective an institution is 
legitimate when it is widely believed to have the right to rule.169 
Legitimacy is therefore a subjective quality, defined by the perception of 
the institution in the eyes of the individual.170 There is a sharp distinction 
between sociological and normative perspectives. From a sociological 
perspective making a claim about the legitimacy of certain global 
institutions should not be seen as a "moral claim about the universal 
legitimacy, or even less the moral worth, of any particular international 
                                                 
167 For a similar conclusion see Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, supra note 156, at 
1004. 
168 My emphasis. Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global 
Governance Institutions, 20 Ethics & International Affairs 405, 411 (2006). 
169 Buchanan and Keohane, ibid, at 405. 
170 Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 International 
Organization 379, 381 (1999). 




rule".171 This understanding of the sociological aspect of legitimacy 
provides, however, only part of the picture because it focuses exclusively 
on the individual perspective. One can also take a systemic-institutional 
view of legitimacy. This perspective conceptualizes legitimacy as a 
measure of the capacity of the law to maintain its autonomy and as a 
measure of the growth or contraction of legal communication. 
 
In exploring the relation between legitimacy and validity I want to focus 
on one concrete question: what are the implications of the autological and 
increasingly heterogeneous character of the concept of validity for the 
legitimacy of global law? I will start with the moral aspect of legitimacy 
and will then consider the sociological aspect. Initially one can take the 
view that the validity of the law is irrelevant to the question of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy is a moral measure, which is determined by moral 
considerations; as such, it should not be influenced by internal legal 
constructions. However, as Buchanan and Keohane demonstrate, the moral 
legitimacy of international legal institutions is also a function of the 
operational dynamics of the legal system. To the extent that the various 
paradoxes of validity influence this dynamic they can also influence the 
legitimacy of the law. 
 
Buchanan and Keohane make a two-fold argument in this context. They 
argue, first, that legitimacy is primarily an instrumental measure. "The 
basic reason for states or other addressees of institutional rules to take 
them as binding and for individuals generally to support or at least to not 
interfere with the operation of these institutions is that they provide 
benefits that cannot otherwise be obtained. If an institution cannot 
effectively perform the functions invoked to justify its existence, then this 
insufficiency undermines its claim to the right to rule".172 Second, 
Buchanan and Keohane suggest that part of the legitimacy of global 
governance institutions lies in certain epistemic-deliberative qualities. In 
particular they argue that to be legitimate a global governance institution 
must create the conditions for ongoing critical contestation of its goals and 
                                                 
171 Hurd, ibid, at 381. 
172 Buchanan and Keohane, supra note 168, at 422. 
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terms of accountability, through interaction with agents and organizations 
outside the institution.173 Achieving such epistemic responsiveness 
requires that the institution to be both transparent and open to dialogue 
with external epistemic actors.174  
 
The question then is in what way does the autological and increasingly 
heterogeneous quality of the concept of validity influence these two 
measures of legitimacy? If one adopts the view that the unfolding 
incoherence of the international legal system could lead to operational 
paralysis, one could conclude this will ultimately reduce the legitimacy of 
the international legal system. If, on the other hand, one adopts the view 
that this heterogeneity contributes to the resilience of the global legal 
system and to its capacity to cope with the range of problems facing the 
global society (as I have argued above), then it is reasonable to assume 
that this heterogeneity should contribute to the legitimacy of the 
international legal body.   
 
The paradoxes of validity could also enhance the legitimacy of 
international institutions by contributing to their epistemic responsiveness. 
The autological character of the transnational legal system turns it into a 
highly innovative system. It is, in the words of Heinz von Foerster, a non-
trivial machine. Non-trivial machines – unlike trivial machines such as 
cars and mobile phones – are highly disobedient and unpredictable. In 
non-trivial machines "a response once observed for a given stimulus may 
not be the same for the same stimulus given later".175  The autological 
nature of the law allows it to continuously challenge its traditional 
                                                 
173 Buchanan and Keohane, ibid, at 406, 432. 
174 Buchanan and Keohane, ibid, at 432. 
175 Heinz von Foerster, Principles of Self-Organization - In a Socio-Managerial Context. 
Self-Organization and Management of Social Systems: Insights, Promises, Doubts, and 
Questions. H. Ulrich and G. J. B. Probst, eds. (1984) 10. See also Hanno Kaiser 
"Normativity, Trivial Machines, and Punishment." Law & Society Blog - Notes from the 
intersection of law, society, technology, economics, and culture - Jurisprudence; June 
30th, 2004; http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/2 (2004). 




doctrines, analogies, and conceptual constructs. The broad ensemble of 
validating techniques which characterize the global legal system further 
enriches this self-reflection process. One of the main virtues of this self-
referential dynamic is that it provides some guarantee against domination 
and exclusion. By creating an opening for a change it provides a room and 
hope for critical voices. In a world that cherishes diversity of life forms, 
this competency constitutes an important virtue.176 The deep heterogeneity 
of the global legal system seems to cohere better with the cultural diversity 
of the global society.      
 
The sociological connection between legitimacy and validity constitutes a 
difficult question. From a systemic perspective I have argued that the 
paradoxes of validity may contribute to the resilience of the law, and in 
that sense may contribute also to its legitimacy (understood as a measure 
of legal autonomy and the intensity of legal communication). Decoding 
the influence of paradoxes of validity on individual perceptions of 
legitimacy provides a difficult psychological puzzle. First, because of the 
low visibility of the paradoxes of validity, it is uncertain to what extent 
they affect the perception of global law within the wide public. If people 
are not aware of the incoherence and auto-logical character of the current 
global law, this fact will not affect their normative beliefs. Second, these 
features may influence subjective beliefs in different ways. Incoherence, 
for example may cause a loss of legitimacy by portraying law as a field in 
which decisions are made in a chaotic and arbitrary fashion. The self-
referential nature of validity may put in doubt the bindingness of law - its 
capacity to provide content-independent reasons for action. Law has 
developed, however, doctrinal mechanisms that can cope with these 
questions (e.g., the use of vague concepts).177 
 
                                                 
176 See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND “THE POLITICS OF 
RECOGNITION” (1992); Lawrence Blum, Recognition, Value, And Equality:  A Critique of 
Charles Taylor’s and Nancy Fraser’s Accounts of Multiculturalism, 5 CONSTELLATIONS 
51 (1998). 
177 Perez, Oren. 2006. The Institutionalization of Inconsistency: from Fluid Concepts to 
Random Walk. In Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law, edited by O. Perez and G. 
Teubner. Oxford: Hart Publishing 119. 
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The cognitive reaction to legal paradoxes is still an under-explored 
question. So let me conclude this discussion by looking at the findings of a 
recent article, which explored the cognitive repercussions of the similar 
truth-teller paradox. Shira Elqayam explored the way reasoners evaluate 
Truthteller-type propositions (‘‘I am telling the truth’’) and Liar-type 
propositions (‘‘I am lying’’). It found, through two experiments, the 
existence of a ‘‘collapse illusion’’, in which reasoners evaluate 
Truthteller-type propositions as if they were simply true, whereas Liar-
type propositions tend to be evaluated as neither true nor false. This 
psychological result is inconsistent with the philosophical view of 
Truthteller-type propositions, which considers them as hopelessly 
indeterminate.178 Elqayam offers several psychological explanations for 
this phenomenon which we cannot consider in detail here.179 However, it 
would be interesting to explore whether a similar phenomenon exists also 
in the case of validity.  
 
 
VII. FROM GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM TO 
CONTEXTUAL REFLEXIVITY 
 
Modern international law is impure, messy and complex. But the attempts 
to purify it through appeals to grand theories - constitutional, moral or 
other - are ill-conceived.180 First, because they fail to recognize the innate 
paradoxicality of law. Second, because they constitute a threat to the 
legitimacy and resilience of the global legal system. The study of diversity 
and resilience in the ecological domain demonstrates the systemic value of 
                                                 
178 Shira Elqayam, The Collapse Illusion Effect: A Semantic-pragmatic Illusion of Truth 
and Paradox, 12 THINKING & REASONING 144 (2006). 
179 Ibid, at 150. 
180 Echoes to this purifying mode can be found, for example, in the 'constitutional 
moment' hypothesis of Slaughter and Burke-White (supra note 73), in David Held's 
Cosmopolitanism (supra note 69), and in Josef Kunz dual hierarchy model (supra note 
116).  




diversity. In terms of institutional design, it suggests a shift from unifying 
models, based on hierarchical normative and institutional structures to 
reflexive models, which could enhance and support the diversity of the 
global legal system. Indeed, as the concepts of normativity and rule of law 
become entrenched in the communicative fabric of the global society, 
there is more room for experimenting with novel reflexive institutional 
structures.  
 
I would like to conclude this article with two examples of highly reflexive 
legal structures. Underlying both examples is the idea of distributed 
authority. Such more refined authority configurations provide richer 
opportunities for internal dialogue, self-contestation and conceptual 
innovation. The price, though, is some loss of coherence. The two 
examples demonstrate how the use of reflexive structure can affect both 
the micro- dynamic of a single regime, and the inter-play between several 
regimes. The examples also differ in their model of distributed authority 
and in the construction of their reflexive dynamic.      
 
My first example focuses on the Global Reporting Initiative ('GRI'). The 
GRI was founded in 1997 by the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies in partnership with the United Nations 
Environment Programme. The GRI is based on three, and potentially 
conflicting pillars: first, a commitment to multi-stakeholder decision-
making; second, an ideological commitment to the ethos of sustainable 
development; third, a formal, hierarchical institutional structure. The 
commitment to consensual decision-making is reflected for example in the 
text of the G3 Sustainability Guidelines (2006):181  
 
"Transparency about the sustainability of organizational activities is of 
interest to a diverse range of stakeholders, including business, labor, non-
                                                 
181 It also finds resonance in the description of the GRI in its website: "The 'Global 
Reporting Initiative' is a large multi-stakeholder network of thousands of experts, in 
dozens of countries worldwide, who participate in GRI’s working groups and governance 
bodies, use the GRI Guidelines to report, access information in GRI-based reports, or 
contribute to develop the Reporting Framework in other ways – both formally and 
informally"; GRI, Who we are, at 
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/, visited 8 march 2007. 
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governmental organizations, investors, accountancy, and others. This is 
why GRI has relied on the collaboration of a large network of experts from 
all of these stakeholder groups in consensus-seeking consultations. These 
consultations, together with practical experience, have continuously 
improved the Reporting Framework since GRI’s founding in 1997. This 
multi-stakeholder approach to learning has given the Reporting 
Framework the widespread credibility it enjoys with a range of 
stakeholder groups" 
 
The commitment to the value of sustainable development is set out in the 
G3 Guidelines. Thus, the Guidelines open with the famous definition of 
sustainability provided in the World Commission on Environment and 
Development report 'Our Common Future'.182 In addition to its the 
commitments to multi-stakeholder consultation and sustainable 
development the GRI is also based on a carefully designed hierarchical 
structure. The GRI is run by a Board of Directors and a Secretariat. The 
Board has "the ultimate fiduciary, financial and legal responsibility for the 
GRI, including final decision making authority on GRI Guidelines 
revisions, organizational strategy, and work plans".183 The Secretariat is 
responsible for implementing "the technical work plan set by the Board of 
Directors".184 While the Stakeholder Council185 is supposed to provide a 
                                                 
182  The goal of sustainable development is to “meet the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. World 
Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987) 43. 
183 The GRI formal instruments of incorporation are not published on the website; I'm 
relying therefore on the information that was made public on the website. See,  
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/Board/, visited 8 March 2007. 
184 It also supports "the operations of the Board of Directors, Stakeholder Council and 
Technical Advisory 
Committee"http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/Secretariat/, visited 8 
March 2007. 
185 The Stakeholder Council ('SC') has 60 members. It meets annually and constitutes "the 
GRI’s formal stakeholder policy forum, similar to a parliament, that debates and 
deliberates key strategic and policy issues". However its only formal powers are to 
approve nominations for the Board of Directors and to provide it with strategic 
recommendations. The SC members are chosen by the Organizational Stakeholders. See 




kind of parliamentary scrutiny on with respect to the Board's decision 
making processes, its formal powers are very limited. The Board has the 
formal capacity to adopt policies that are inconsistent with the results of 
the deliberation process and the ideological commitment to sustainable 
development. 
 
The tri-partite normative commitment of the GRI could potentially lead to 
a range of irresolvable conflicts. Despite this potential for internal quarrels 
the GRI has functioned in an admirable fashion over the last years. It has 
produced two Reporting Guidelines over a period of 4 years (2002, 
2006).186 These Guidelines have not only reflected a deep commitment to 
ecological values - setting ambitious reporting standards that depart from 
the conventional, economic-oriented accounting principles - but have also 
influenced in a substantive way the reporting practices of Multinational 
Corporations.187 The GRI reflexive structure seems to have provided the 
organization with both innovative capacity and the legitimacy to carry out 
its mission. Further, it succeeded in a domain in which progress through 
the treaty-making route, would have been much more difficult.  
 
My second example is based on the vision of judicial dialogue, drawing on 
the mechanism of preliminary ruling which was developed in the 
European Union. This mechanism can be used both in the context of single 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/StakeholderCouncil/  
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/OrganizationalStakeholders/, 
visited 8 March 2007. 
186 See, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/ (visited 27 
March 2007). 
187 A survey published in 2005 by KPMG analysed trends in corporate responsibility 
reporting among the world's top 250 companies of the Fortune 500 ('G250') and top 100 
companies in 16 countries ('N100'); KPMG, International Survey of Corporate 
Responsibility Reporting (2005). The report found that sustainability reporting has now 
become mainstream among G250 companies (68 percent) and fast becoming so among 
N100 companies (48 percent), ibid, at 4. The influence of the GRI Guidelines was 
reflected by the fact that 40 per cent of the reporters mentioned that the Guidelines were 
the tool used by the corporation to decide about the content of the sustainability report; 
ibid, at 20.    
 
 
68                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 03 NO. 04 
 
regimes and in the context of cross—regimes relationships. Under Article 
234 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,188 the European 
Court of Justice ("ECJ") may give preliminary rulings interpreting 
European law at the request of any national court. This mechanism was 
initially intended to address only questions relating to the validity of 
European law. However the ECJ successfully encouraged national courts 
to use the mechanism to review the compatibility of national law with 
European law. As a result of the preliminary reference mechanism there 
have been fewer occasions in which the ECJ has exercised its authority to 
review national judicial decisions. Instead, the ECJ's interaction with 
national courts has become something akin to judicial dialogue, with 
reciprocal learning and exchange of ideas.189 
 
The European model can serve as a template for creating more extensive 
dialogue between international tribunals and national courts and possibly 
also between different international tribunals. The two regimes that were 
discussed in section III – the WTO and the ICC – provide only limited 
opportunities for such dialogue. In the ICC treaty the principle that the 
Court is to be ‘complementary’ to national criminal proceedings could be 
seen as a possible platform for this kind of judicial dialogue. The Rome 
Statute provides that the ICC will not exercise its jurisdiction if the state is 
genuinely willing to carry out the investigation or prosecution of crimes.190 
The Statute also outlines processes for judicial review of national court 
decisions.191 Formally, the determination as to whether the domestic court 
proceedings were independent and impartial lies solely with the ICC itself. 
However, such intervention in domestic legal proceedings is likely to 
                                                 
188 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 26, 
2001, O.J. (C 80) 1 (2001), art. 234. Article 234 previously was encompassed in Article 
177 of the Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 109. 
189 See, Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of 
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U.L. Rev.  2029, 2156-2157 (2005). 
190 See, Rome Statute, Article 17. See further Maogoto, supra note 55, at 19. 
191 Maogoto, ibid, at 20. 




prove highly controversial and thus we can expect the Court to be careful 
in using this authority.192 It seems that incorporating some form of 
preliminary ruling procedure into the ICC treaty could provide more room 
for judicial dialogue, while at the same time defusing some of the political 
tension associated with the judicial review procedure. The WTO does not 
have procedures that could facilitate a constructive dialogue between 
national courts and the WTO judicial tribunals (although national courts 
play an important role in enforcing sections of the WTO rule-book, 
especially in the fields of anti-dumping, intellectual property rights, and 
government procurement).193 In both cases, and in particular that of the 
WTO, designing procedures that will facilitate an equal-footed dialogue 
between national and international courts could contribute to the 
reflexivity and legitimacy of the legal system as a whole.194 
 
The conceptual shift from purity to reflexivity asks us then to embrace the 
paradoxicality of law. The polymorphosis process seems to mark the end 










                                                 
192 Maogoto, ibid, at 21. 
193 See, e.g., in the case of anti-dumping: James P. Durling, Deference, But Only When 
Due: WTO Review of Anti-Dumping Measures 6 Journal of International Economic Law 
125 (2003). 
194 It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the details of such procedures. It is 
clear however that in order to facilitate dialogue they should not be designed so as to 
merely crystallize the supremacy of the international tribunal. In designing such 
dialogical mechanisms we should take into account the fact that the WTO rule-book, 
unlike EU law, is not directly applicable within the jurisdictions of most WTO members.  
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